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Tammy Lynn Cook, a mentally ill mother, lost her parental rights
and custody of her son and daughter whom she had abused and ne1
glected. Rejecting her appeal, the court discussed at length Cook’s
failure to cooperate with social services and the treatment offered to
her, as well as the lack of improvement in her parenting since the ini2
tial removal of her children. Because of her “reckless actions” in regards to her own mental health, the court held it was “clearly not in
the children’s best interests for mother to maintain her . . . parental
rights . . . with no evidence that mother will ever rectify the condi3
tions that posed harm to them.” On its face, this ruling seems reasonable as it privileges children’s safety and well-being over the parental rights of a mother who harms them and is continuously unable
to recover from her mental illness. But digging deeper into the issue
of parental mental health and the consequential neglect or abuse of
children could teach otherwise. Separating parents and children
need not always be the only way to protect children.
1
2
3

See Cook v. Roanoke Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 2930-00-3, 2001 WL 7467686 (Va. Ct. App.
July 3, 2001).
Id. at *4.
Id.
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With the decrease of treatment in hospital commitment settings
and an increase of community-based services, the number of parents
4
with schizophrenia—in particular, women—has grown. Additionally,
women with severe mental illness are just as likely as mentally healthy
women to marry and have children, but are at a higher risk of losing
5
custody of their children. Studies suggest that as much as 70–80% of
6
parents that have a mental illness lose custody of their children.
Ironically, it is the fear of losing their children that deters parents
from seeking much needed treatment that could help prevent ne7
glect or abuse of children. If parents do turn to services, these often
are inadequate in addressing their special needs both as people with
8
a severe mental illness and as parents. However, not all services are
futile. Since the 1970s, social sciences have developed treatment
plans—Programs of Assertive Community Treatment (PACTs)—that
have been proven effective in achieving recovery for people with severe mental illness, particularly schizophrenia. Moreover, PACTs are
also highly successful in improving performance in different areas of
life, including parenting and family functioning. Over ten states have
9
PACTs as part of state-sponsored social services, and others have
even incorporated PACTs into their legal system as an alternative to
10
criminal proceedings.

4

5
6

7

8
9

10

See Barry J. Ackerson, Parents with Serious and Persistent Mental Illness: Issues in Assessment
and Services, SOC. WORK, Spring 2003, at 187, 188 (discussing an unexpected “increase in
women with a severe mental illness bearing and raising children”). To clarify, this is not
to say that there are more people, or women, suffering from schizophrenia because of the
decrease in hospitalization—only that there are more people with schizophrenia who become parents, and that these people tend to be women.
Id.
Carolyn Mason et al., Clients with Mental Illness and Their Children: Implications for Clinical
Practice, 28 ISSUES MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 1105, 1106 (2007) (noting that rates of custody loss by parents with mental illness have been reported as high as 80%).
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 191 (stating that social services that are designed to improve
parenting skills are not fitted for parents with mental illnesses. Parents with mental illness, then, often drop out of such programs or—if they do participate—are unable to
benefit from them. “[T]he didactic method of instruction combined with the severity of
[these parents’] illness may impede their ability to apply the lessons to their own situations”).
See id. at 193 (considering the unique role social work can have in addressing the needs of
people with mental illness and parents in general).
See Paul B. Gold et al., The Program of Assertive Community Treatment: Implementation and
Dissemination of an Evidence-Based Model of Community-Based Care for Persons with Severe and
Persistent Mental Illness, 10 COGNITIVE & BEHAV. PRAC. 290, 295–96 (2003) (discussing the
states with PACTs as a part of state sponsored social services, including Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina, New Jersey, New Mexico, South Dakota,
Texas, Virginia, and Rhode Island).
Such states include Florida and Texas. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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In light of PACTs and their advantages, this Article argues that the
solution the law provides to families struggling with parental mental
illness—that is, family separation in the form of children’s removal or
termination of parental rights—is highly troubling. Using a funda11
mental right concept to family integrity as a starting point, I argue
that separating children from parents without exploring an alternative that has a higher potential for success overly burdens family in12
tegrity. Moreover, child protection is a suspect justification for such
a severe infringement, because it does not consider the need to protect children from the harms of removal, such as abuse and neglect in
foster care, or psychological wounds caused by separation from attachment figures in the child’s family of origin. As such, family separation jeopardizes substantive due process rights of families both as
13
individuals and as a collective. My argument, however, should not
be taken to be overly sweeping. I do not mean to state that in all cases family separation violates substantive due process rights. I merely
maintain that lawmakers should be aware of the heightened risk of
unnecessary separations. Substantive due process, therefore, requires—at the very least—exploring PACTs as a less restrictive alternative.
I build my argument in three steps. In Part I, I discuss schizophrenia and its impact on parenting and on children of parents with
schizophrenia. I choose to focus on schizophrenia because of its extreme severity and its debilitating effects on almost all levels of functioning. Such all-encompassing impairments create substantial challenges to parenting, but do not necessarily negate parenting abilities
altogether in all cases. Therefore a choice between family preservation and family separation is all the more complex. Part I goes on to
present the current models of legal interventions on the federal and

11

Though not explicitly terming this as a right to “family integrity,” the Supreme Court has
long recognized a parent’s fundamental right to the childrearing, custody and companionship of her child. As this Article progresses, I present the argument that both children
and parents should enjoy this fundamental right, and that they should be able to hold
this right as a family unit, that is, that family integrity is an aggregated right of the family
as a collective. See infra Part II.A.

12

Throughout this Article I use the terms “family integrity,” “family unity” and “family preservation” interchangeably. All refer to keeping the family as a cohesive unit, where parental rights remain intact and parents are the custodians and caregivers of their children. I use these terms in opposition to removal of children from the home or
termination of parental rights, which I refer to as “family separation.”

13

See infra Part II.A.2, where I argue that fundamental rights, both of parents and of children, should not be considered as conflicting positions or interests. Rather, where family
preservation is concerned, these rights can, and should, be viewed as complementing
each other, and therefore as aggregated.

Mar. 2010]

DUE PROCESS THROUGH COMPREHENSIVE CARE

789

state levels. Most state laws are designed to protect children from
harm at the hands of parents with schizophrenia, primarily through
family separation. In doing so, these states comply with the overarching framework of privileging family separation that federal law dictates. I later focus on Virginia law as representative of most other
states, and as a good example of how state laws burden parents with
mental illness. Virginia law adds additional burdens, however, because it articulates a presumption that, as a rule, mental illness causes
unfit parenting. Because of the harshness of Virginia law, this state is
in much need of change to better serve families and uphold substantive due process rights. Yet Virginia also has immense potential to
lead toward positive growth, because it already has operating statesponsored PACTs.
Part II concentrates on my argument that family separation is inconsistent with substantive due process. I apply the test the Supreme
14
Court utilized in Washington v. Glucksberg, which first requires the existence of a fundamental right. Here, I argue that aggregating already recognized fundamental rights of parents and children would
elevate family preservation to the level of a fundamental right, as well.
Next, the Glucksberg test applies strict scrutiny to the state’s infringement on that fundamental right. Put differently, removal or termination of parental rights must be narrowly tailored to serve the state’s
compelling interest, i.e., child protection. Following this substantive
due process test, my analysis leads me to conclude that family separation fails to protect children from harm and therefore does not serve
the state’s purported compelling interest.
Part III expands on the “narrowly tailored” prong of the strict
scrutiny test. Here, I argue that the availability of PACTs as effective
treatment for people with schizophrenia renders them a less restrictive means to family separation. I go on to demonstrate how PACTs
have been utilized as a less restrictive alternative to criminal proceedings in Florida. The operation of PACTs in Florida demonstrates
how PACTs are a beneficial, interdisciplinary solution to the multitude of issues that families struggle with when a parent suffers from
schizophrenia. Part III also argues that in order to ensure their efficacy as a less restrictive alternative for families, PACTs should be designed to provide families with comprehensive services that will promote parents’ recovery as well as children’s well-being. However,
even in their family-oriented form, PACTs still may raise concerns.
For this reason, I end Part III grappling with some of the potential

14

521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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oppositions to the PACTs solution I advocate. Particularly, I address
the doubt that PACTs do in fact protect children, and the concern
that PACTs establish positive rights that overly burden the state by
requiring provision of services. I conclude by highlighting Virginia’s
leading role in changing current interventions and by introducing
other fields of family law and parental unfitness in which substantive
due process should be re-examined.
I. MENTAL DISABILITIES AND PARENTING
A. Schizophrenia—A Typology
At the outset, a discussion of schizophrenia and its symptoms, diagnostic process and prognosis is imperative in order to understand
the parenting issues surrounding it. Misconceptions around schizophrenia among social service providers and legal professionals lead to
more separations of children from parents than necessary. A better
understanding of parenting with schizophrenia facilitates a more nuanced view of who can be a capable parent despite the illness and
which the law, in turn, ought to reflect. Schizophrenia is a severe
15
mental illness, characterized by a breakdown of personality functions, withdrawal from reality and disturbed emotional and cognitive
16
processes.
The impaired sense of reality is mainly manifested
17
through delusions, illusions and hallucinations. While this wide variety of disturbances to thought, perception, emotion, motivation and
motor activities typical of schizophrenia could result in an inability to
function or care for one’s self, other persons may only experience a
18
minor decrease in coping abilities.
15

16

17

18

See Laurie T. Izutsu, Applying Atkins v. Virginia to Capital Defendants with Severe Mental Illness, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 995, 1012 (2005) (discussing that the term “severe mental illness”
is usually restricted to schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder and bipolar disorder).
Schizophrenic disorder, in AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, GLOSSARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS,
available at http://www.apa.org/research/action/glossary.aspx#s (last visited Feb. 16,
2010).
See Krista A. Gallager, Note, Parents in Distress: A State’s Duty to Provide Reunification Services
to Mentally Ill Parents, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 234, 236 (2000) (discussing the
disorted perceptions of reality experienced by people with schizophrenia). Delusions are
false beliefs founded on mistaken interpretations of reality, which are inconsistent with
one’s intelligence or culture and persist despite reason or evidence of their incorrectness.
Hallucinations are false sensory perceptions that do not derive from actual, real stimuli.
In schizophrenia, hallucinations tend to be auditory, though visual hallucinations are
common as well. See Éva Szeli, Ex Parte Civil Commitment, Family Care-Givers, and Schizophrenia: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 529, 530–31 (2000) (considering hallucinations and delusions of people with schizophrenia).
Peter F. Liddle, Descriptive Clinical Features of Schizophrenia, in 1 NEW OXFORD TEXTBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY 571 (Michael G. Gelder et al. eds., 2000).
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A set of phenomena indicative of schizophrenia demonstrates how
the disorder causes some to lose their sense of ownership of their
own mental or physical activity. At different cycles of the progression
or severity of schizophrenia, one could experience a lack of agency
and autonomy, attributing thoughts and behaviors to an outside
19
source. These symptoms include sensory hallucinations, primarily
auditory; delusions influencing the interpretation of events or others’
behavior; and an experience of losing control over one’s own emo20
tions and thoughts.
As a psychosis involving the breakdown of a sense of reality, schizophrenia is characterized by a lack of insight regarding the illness.
Lacking insight means that a person with schizophrenia may fail to
accept her illness or to understand that all or some of her symptoms
21
are a consequence of the illness. Thus the lack of insight is not a
denial of illness but a lack of awareness coupled with persistent disbe22
lief that the illness distorts reality. As a result of the lack of insight, a
23
person may avoid, refuse or discontinue treatment.

19
20

21
22
23

See id. at 572–73 (discussing the clinical symptoms of schizophrenia).
See id. at 573, 580 (listing the Schneiderian first-rank symptoms). First-rank symptoms
are: (a) voices commenting: auditory hallucinations of a voice commenting, usually in a
negative and judgmental manner, on one’s actions; (b) voices discussing or arguing: auditory hallucinations of multiple voices discussing or arguing about oneself; (c) audible
thought: hearing one’s own thoughts as if spoken; (d) thought insertion: experiencing
thoughts as not of one’s own but rather inserted by an alien source; (e) thought withdrawal: the belief that an alien agency is removing thoughts from one’s mind;
(f) thought broadcast: experiencing thoughts as being broadcast to become available to
others; (g) made will: experiencing a loss of control over will, which becomes subject to
alien influence; (h) made acts: the belief that behavior are actions of an alien agency, rather than one’s own actions; (i) made affect: emotion that is not one’s own but influence
by outside source; (j) somatic passivity: bodily functions controlled by alien forces;
(k) delusional perception: attributing unwarranted and unreasonable meanings to normal perception. These phenomena, however, are not used as diagnostic tools. Instead, a
diagnosis of schizophrenia requires the existence of bizarre delusions and/or commenting voices or voices conversing over an extended period of time; or the existence of at
least two of the following symptoms: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech,
grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, or negative symptoms. To conclude the diagnosis, other possible conditions such as brief mood disturbances or substance abuse must
be excluded. Symptoms must be present for at least a month. Additionally, symptoms
must exist for a significant portion of a month prior to the diagnosis along with six
months of disturbance in social or occupational functions. Id.
See id. at 574 (emphasizing that lack of insight is a defining characteristic of psychotic illness).
See Izutsu, supra note 15, at 1014 (“The inability or refusal to comply with treatment tends
to lead to exacerbation of symptoms and coinciding disturbances in behavior.”).
See Liddle, supra note 18, at 574 (considering the role lack of insight has in refusing to
accept treatment).
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The expectancy rate for developing schizophrenia in the general
24
population is around, or slightly lower than, 1%. Rates of schizo25
phrenia among men and women are practically the same. Additionally, there is no clear and conclusive evidence that symptoms are
qualitatively different between sexes. Whatever differences do exist,
they are generally attributed to other male or female dissimilarities,
such as brain development or social gender roles, rather than schizo26
phrenia itself.
Findings regarding the high rates of schizophrenia among family
members suggest that genetics are a necessary, though insufficient,
risk-factor for schizophrenia. Additionally, the closer the family connection—that is, the more common genes—the higher the risk of
27
schizophrenia development. Other biological risk factors are factors
that influence brain development such as pre- and perinatal dam28
age.
Besides biological factors, social or familial environments also may
contribute to the development of schizophrenia. Research suggests
that underprivileged socio-economic status or ethnic minority status
can be risk factors, as well as having been born and raised in an urban
29
environment. Marital status, however, has a mitigating effect on
schizophrenia. Marriage can delay the onset of schizophrenia or cu30
shion its impact and severity of symptoms. These findings about the
causes of schizophrenia are notable for two reasons. First, the strong
genetic connection between parents and children suggests that, to
the extent removal of children is meant to prevent development of
the child’s schizophrenia, it is unjustifiable. Removing a child from
her parent’s care does not control for the biological factors that contribute to the development of schizophrenia. Second, these findings
about causation of schizophrenia reinforce the importance of family

24

25

26
27
28
29
30

See id. at 590 (“The frequently cited ‘rule of thumb’ estimate of disease expectancy for
schizophrenia [is] at around 1 per cent . . . .”); Gallager, supra note 17, at 236 (“Approximately 1% to 2% of the U.S. population is schizophrenic.”).
See Liddle, supra note 18, at 590 (discussing the onset rates of men and women at different ages). But see Gallager, supra note 17, at 236 (citing evidence that perhaps men are
1.5 times more likely to develop schizophrenia than women due to differences in diagnostic tools).
See Liddle, supra note 18, at 591 (considering the symptomatic differences between males
and females diagnosed with schizophrenia).
See id. at 593 (discussing the role genetic risk can play in schizophrenia).
See id. at 593–94.
See id. at 595 (exploring the environmental factors relevant to the onset of schizophrenia).
See id.
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preservation to persons with schizophrenia, because maintaining the
family unit can help postpone or ease their suffering.
The course of schizophrenia moves in cycles of psychotic episodes
31
and partial or complete remissions. Although during the first ten
years following initial onset one’s condition usually deteriorates, most
32
will later experience stabilization and gradual improvement. But
outcomes vary significantly and range from complete recovery to unremitting illness and deterioration of cognitive and mental func33
tions. According to long-term studies, as many as 50% of people
34
with schizophrenia recover and lead productive and satisfying lives.
In other words, at different stages of schizophrenia some may very
well be able to function and may be contributing members to society,
including being valuable resources for their children.
Different methods of treatment are effective. For example, drug
treatment, specifically anti-psychotics, mitigate symptoms, increase
cognitive function, assist with modifying behavior and decrease resis35
tance to treatment. These medications help with the chemical imbalance in the brain that seems to cause symptoms such as delusions
36
Effective psychosocial interventions are also
and hallucinations.
available.
These interventions include psychodynamic therapy
(though usually combined with anti-psychotic medications) or programs training self-management and social skills development focus37
ing on the individual’s own environment and needs. Family interventions, by contrast, focus on the family dynamics’ impact on the
person suffering from schizophrenia. They address the possible hostility within the family and attempt to resolve negative or harmful dy-

31

32
33
34

35
36

37

Specifically, five primary patterns for the course of schizophrenia have been identified:
single psychotic episode followed by complete remission; single psychotic episode followed by incomplete remission; at least two psychotic episodes with complete remission
between episodes; at least two episodes with incomplete remission between them; and
continuous psychotic illness. See id. at 615.
See id. (explaining a three-stage classification of post-onset course for schizophrenia).
See id. at 619 (considering the extreme variances of relapses and partial remissions of persons diagnosed with schizophrenia).
See Leighton Y. Huey et al., Families and Schizophrenia: The View from Advocacy, 30
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 549, 559 (2007) (considering the ability of patients to recover
from schizophrenia and lead productive lives).
See D.G. Cunningham & E.C. Johnstone, Treatment and Management of Schizophrenia, in 1
NEW OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 18, at 621.
See Shari Lynne Kahn, Comment, The Right to Adequate Treatment Versus the Right to Refuse
Antipsychotic Drug Treatment: A Solution to the Dilemma of the Involuntarily Committed Psychiatric Patient, 33 EMORY L. J. 441, 446 (1984) (explaining the role of antipsychotic drugs in
the alleviation of symptoms).
See Cunningham & Johnstone, supra note 35, at 625–26 (considering various types of psychotherapy available for schizophrenia).
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namics by educating family members about schizophrenia and offer38
ing advice regarding coping with the illness.
Because of the wide variation in experiences of schizophrenia between different people, as well as the diversity in the types and intensity of symptoms, considering all persons with schizophrenia as incapable of a well-functioning life oversimplifies their condition.
Further, it ignores the array of efficient interventions toward recovery. The result of essentializing the impact of schizophrenia on a
person’s life is the risk of inadequate legal actions that are not sufficiently nuanced to account for differences between people with schizophrenia. As an example of such shortcomings in the law, the remainder of this Article focuses on the limited ability of current legal
frameworks to reflect distinctions between parents who have lost their
ability to parent their children because of schizophrenia, and other
parents who remain fit parents despite the illness.
B. The Impact of Schizophrenia on Parenting
Parents with severe mental illness, such as schizophrenia, are often considered by social science, the law and society at large to be in39
adequate parents who may cause grave harm to their children. This,
however, may not always be the case for all parents with schizophrenia, although schizophrenia could impair parenting abilities in various ways. Symptoms may directly diminish parenting skills by limiting
ability to read non-verbal cues or to navigate social interactions suc40
cessfully. Also, an altered sense of reality caused by symptoms such
as delusions or hallucinations may result in neglect or abuse of a
41
child; a parent distracted or preoccupied with a delusion or obses42
sion could withdraw from the child or become unavailable. Symptoms such as social withdrawal or irritability also hinder a parent’s responsiveness to her child, or her ability to express warmth or to be a
43
nurturing parent. A parent’s capability to discipline a child ade38
39

40
41

42
43

See id. at 625.
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 187–88 (considering the role mental health literature has
played in focusing on the negative aspects of parenting by people with serious mental illness).
See id. at 190.
See id. (“Parents with schizophrenia may have an impaired ability to read nonverbal cues
or to engage in mutual social interchange and may present a greater risk of physical
abuse as a result of hallucinations or delusions.”).
See Jacqueline Barnes & Alan Stein, Effects of Parental Psychiatric and Physical Illness on Child
Development, in 2 NEW OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 18, at 1848, 1849.
See Corina Benjet et al., Evaluating the Parental Fitness of Psychiatrically Diagnosed Individuals:
Advocating a Functional-Contextual Analysis of Parenting, 17 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 238, 242 (2003)
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44

quately is compromised as well. Alternatively, the parent could in45
corporate the child in the delusion or obsession. However, these
phenomena do not necessarily put a child in direct physical danger.
It is important to note that overall, persons with schizophrenia are no
more violent or dangerous than the rest of the population, unless the
illness is coupled with other conditions or disorders, such as sub46
stance abuse.
Other challenges parents with schizophrenia may face are the so47
cial issues incidental to schizophrenia. Stigmatization leads to decreased educational or vocational opportunities, instability of rela48
tionships and unavailability of health care insurance.
Impoverishment and homelessness are also related to mental illness
49
and are detrimental to family dynamics. Yet these are not factors
that render a parent unfit, though they play a determinative role in
the perception of a mentally ill parent’s fitness. Misunderstanding
the complexity of schizophrenia and its impact on parenting could
lead to assumptions about parents with schizophrenia as unfit, incapable or dangerous parents. Perhaps because of these social challenges, many parents are reluctant to seek professional assistance in
coping with parenting difficulties or with the impact of their illness
50
on their children. Though one possible explanation could be the
lack of insight about the illness itself and its detriment to parenting,
the fact that parents may be fearful of turning to social services for
support because that could trigger custody proceedings resulting in

44

45

46
47

48
49
50

(discussing whether symptoms of parents with schizophrenia render them unfit parents
below community standards).
See Joanne Nicholson et al., Focus on Women: Mothers with Mental Illness: I. The Competing
Demands of Parenting and Living With Mental Illness, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 635, 636
(1998), available at http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/49/5/
635 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010) (considering that mothers with mental illness have greater
difficulty disciplining their children).
See Heather Dipple et al., The Experience of Motherhood in Women with Severe and Enduring
Mental Illness, 37 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY, 336, 337 (2002) (giving
an example of two women who believed they should kill their children).
See Izutsu, supra note 15, at 1018–19; see also Benjet et al., supra note 43, at 240 (finding
that substance abuse was associated with a greater risk for violence than mental illness).
These social effects are not exclusive to schizophrenia. Rather, they could be attached to
mental illness more generally. However, given the severity of the mental illness, people
with schizophrenia are more likely to be affected by these social effects.
See Huey et al., supra note 34, at 554.
See Gallager, supra note 17, at 239 (finding that poverty has been shown to increase the
risk of abuse for children by parents with mental disorders).
See Alisa Busch & Allison D. Redlich, Patients’ Perception of Possible Child Custody or Visitation
Loss for Nonadherence to Psychiatric Treatment, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 999, 999 (2007)
(finding that for at least some parents, “stigma and fear of losing child custody resulted in
delaying needed treatment”).
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51

removal of children is also highly troubling. The hardships of parenting are exacerbated by lack of assistance, and yet parents would
rather struggle than get much needed help for fear of losing their
52
children.
Despite the effects of schizophrenia on parenting abilities, many
53
parents still manage to raise their children well. In fact, women with
schizophrenia who maintain custody of their children function better
than other women with severe mental illness, despite using the same
54
mental health services. This finding is consistent with a different
study that found that hospitalizations of women with schizophrenia
were prolonged when these women had previously been separated
from their children. The study’s authors hypothesized that perhaps
55
the separation had exacerbated schizophrenic symptoms. Because
mothers tend to fare better when they have custody of their children,
and because children may not actually be at risk, it should be in the
interest of the state to prioritize family preservation.
Another level of analyzing the effects of schizophrenia is examining the direct impact it has on the child herself and her own mental
health. A parent’s severe mental illness has the potential of compromising the stability of children’s lives. The cyclicality of schizophrenia could leave a child confused by behavior that swings from
56
loving and nurturing to frightening and unstable. If a child becomes somewhat of a caregiver to the parent in a reversal of normative dependency roles, the child’s physical health could be at risk as
57
well. Another concern is that children of parents with mental illness
58
are prone to poor development, be it cognitive, emotional or social.
These children may exhibit social withdrawal, as well as academic and
behavioral difficulties at school, irritability, stress, along with sleeping

51
52

53
54

55
56
57

58

Id.
As my argument progresses in Part I.C. infra, these concerns of parents seem justified.
With statutes disadvantaging them as parents, it is very likely that once the state intervenes, whether through social services or the legal system, some form of family separation
will occur.
See Barnes & Stein, supra note 42, at 1848.
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 189 (citing a study of case management clients in Massachusetts). Regardless of whether these women maintain custody of their children because
they function better or the other way around, this finding challenges the correlation between severe mental illness and parental unfitness.
See Dipple et al., supra note 45, at 340.
See Huey et al., supra note 34, at 554.
See Benita Walton-Moss et al., Effects of Mental Illness on Family Quality of Life, 26 ISSUES
MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 627, 629 (2005) (explaining that role reversals of dependency
and care in families contributed to negative effects on the caregiver’s health).
See Barnes & Stein, supra note 42, at 1848.
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59

and eating disorders. Because of social stigmatization of mental illnesses, they are highly vulnerable to isolation, discrimination and ha60
rassment.
Children of parents with schizophrenia are also at a heightened
risk of developing schizophrenia themselves, or other poor mental
61
health conditions. For instance, children of parents with schizophrenia demonstrate early attentional difficulties common to schizophrenia that continue in adulthood and may later develop into
62
schizophrenia. A child of a parent with schizophrenia has a 10%
63
risk of developing schizophrenia. Even without becoming full-blown
schizophrenia, attentional deficits may be predictive of associative
64
thought disorders or future relationship problems.
That said, such concerns regarding the well-being of children of
parents with schizophrenia do not materialize in all cases. In fact, research suggests that harms are exacerbated by separation from the
parent. Thus, the rates of mental illness among children not raised
by their parents were somewhat higher than those among children
65
who remained in their mothers’ custody. Being raised by a parent
with schizophrenia, therefore, is not sufficient for the development of
schizophrenia in the child. Children can be resilient despite a parent’s mental illness; a resilience attributed to different coping styles,
66
intellectual abilities or social skills.
These positive findings regarding the effect of parents’ schizophrenia on children, as well as findings about the health benefits of
maintaining children’s custody and care to parents, lead to the conclusion that schizophrenia does not necessarily hinder parenting.
Despite suffering from schizophrenia, parents are a valuable resource
for their children. In the next Part I examine whether the law reflects this conclusion or whether it views schizophrenia as incompatible with parenting, suggesting therefore, that people suffering from
59
60

61
62
63

64
65
66

See generally id. at 1848–49.
See Amy Weir, An Introduction to the Issues: A New Holistic Approach Outlined, in CHILD
PROTECTION AND ADULT MENTAL HEALTH: CONFLICT OF INTEREST? 1, 2 (Amy Weir & Anthony Douglas eds., 1999) (maintaining that children of parents with mental illness can
be vulnerable to bullying and social isolation as a result of negative remarks made about
their parent’s behavior or characteristics).
See Barnes & Stein, supra note 42, at 1850.
See id.
See Gallager, supra note 17, at 236. Though the precise level of contribution is not clear,
both genetics and environmental factors make for this risk. See also supra notes 27–30 and
accompanying text about risk factors for the development of schizophrenia.
See Barnes & Stein, supra note 42, at 1850.
See id.
See id. at 1849.

798

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:3

schizophrenia should not be raising children. My critiques of the law,
primarily federal and Virginia law, center around their heightened
burdens on parents with schizophrenia, the unavailability and inadequacy of services to these parents, the shortcomings of assessment of
mental illness in legal contexts, the law’s assumption that mental illness is permanent and the overly narrow view of the child’s best interest, all of which perpetuate family separation as the only legal remedy for children neglected or abused by parents with
schizophrenia.
C. The Law of Mental Disability and Parenting: Current Models of
Intervention
The law addresses parents with mental illness primarily in the context of custody and termination of parental rights. A mental illness
alone is not ordinarily sufficient for removal of children from a parent’s custody or termination of parental rights. Rather, many jurisdictions require a showing that the parent is unable to care for the
67
child because of her mental illness. However, the law is constructed
to burden parents with mental illness in maintaining or regaining
custody and other parental rights over their children. Presumptions
of unfitness, the denial of social services, or the assumption that unfitness due to schizophrenia persists over time mean that both statutes and courts stand in the way of family preservation. I discuss below the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), the federal statute
most relevant to parents with mental illness. After a general overview
of state law, I move to focus on Virginia law as a more specific example of how states create statutory frameworks that overly burden parents with mental illness.
1. Federal Law—Adoption and Safe Families Act
As termination of parental rights is a common prerequisite for
68
adoption, the relevant federal statute is the Adoption and Safe Fami69
lies Act of 1997 (ASFA), despite not directly targeting parents with
mental illness. In an attempt to move children out of the foster care
system, the Act guides states’ regulation of foster care, family reunifications, termination of parental rights and adoptions. As such, its di67
68
69

For a general discussion of removal and termination in state law, see infra Part I.C.2.
Not every case of adoption requires termination of parental rights. Examples include
step-parent adoptions or second-parent adoptions for same-sex couples.
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (promoting and imposing safety requirements for the adoption of children in foster care).
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rectives are the overarching principles to which state laws conform.
ASFA’s financial incentives further ensure states’ compliance and
prioritization of children’s release for adoption by severing ties with
birth families.
ASFA’s main guiding principle for states is guaranteeing the
70
child’s health and safety. However, ASFA embodies a belief that this
principle is best realized through adoption, rather than family pres71
ervation. According to ASFA, states should make reasonable efforts
to maintain family integrity, but only as long as the child’s health or
72
safety are not compromised. These efforts at family preservation occur at two points in time: first, before foster placement, in order to
73
prevent the child’s removal from home; second, after foster place74
ment to facilitate a child’s safe return to her parents. However,
states are not obligated to make such reasonable efforts if a parent
75
has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances, or if the par76
ent’s parental rights to a sibling were previously terminated.
It would seem, then, that the federal government prioritizes family
preservation, as long as the child’s safety can be guaranteed. However, the fact that states are not required in all instances to provide
77
families with social services facilitates adoption of children because
70
71
72
73
74
75

76
77

42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2006).
See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 105 (2002).
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B).
Id. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i).
Id. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii).
Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i). “Aggravated circumstances” are to be defined by state law and,
according to ASFA, include but are not limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse
and sexual abuse.
Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii).
See infra Part I.C.3–4. In some circumstances—previous termination of parental rights,
for instance—states are not required to provide services. It is unclear whether states can
provide no services whatsoever; state courts generally agree that states are only required
to provide reasonable services, rather than futile ones, which leaves services providers
with much latitude when deciding whether and which services to provide. Examples of
court decisions to this effect include Mary Ellen C. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 971 P.2d 1046, 1053 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing the juvenile court’s severance
order because the State failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it made a
reasonable effort to preserve the family); In re Sydney J., 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2176, at
*27 (June 13, 2005) (finding that the department met its burden by making reasonable
efforts to reunify the mother with the children, even though the mother was unable or
unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts); In re Children of Vasquez, 658 N.W.2d
249, 254–55 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that “reasonable efforts would be futile and
unreasonable” where “appellant failed to comply with his parental duties when he murdered his wife (the children’s mother) and then did not allow the children to attend
their mother’s funeral”); In re Conley/Wilt Children, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 679, at *19–20
(Feb. 6, 1998) (reversing the award of permanent custody to the department and remanding for further proceedings because the lower court had not determined “whether
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parents are denied the assistance they need in order to do better. It
is puzzling why families are left unserved precisely when they face
78
such “aggravated circumstances.” These families are in most need
of services, but are denied the right to them.
When services are to be provided to families, the standard of services provision—i.e., “reasonable”—is unclear. The standard’s vagueness enables far too easy termination of parental rights, as judges
79
can avoid in depth review of the services. Judges may also exercise
broad discretion over the type and scope of services that satisfy the
standard. As a result, courts find agencies that have provided very little, or no, services as compliant, often because of a lack of funding or
80
the unavailability of services. By not specifying mandatory services
or providing guidelines as to which services are “reasonable,” ASFA
effectively excuses agencies from providing any family preservation
81
services at all. This, in turn, perpetuates the parent’s impaired care
for her children and facilitates the termination of her parental rights
and pursuant adoption of her children.
Another reason to question the federal law’s efficacy in fostering
family preservation is that the incentives ASFA puts in place for moving children out of foster care and releasing them for adoption create
82
obstacles for family preservation. For each child adopted out of foster care (beyond a base number of children) a state is eligible for an
83
additional $4,000 from the federal government. An eligible state is
84
that which exceeds in a fiscal year its base number of adoptions.

78
79

80
81
82

83
84

the agency had made reasonable efforts through its case plans to reunite [the mother]
with her children, nor did the court determine that efforts at reunification would have
been futile”).
See ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 109 (“Most people would agree that children have an interest in, if not a right to, government protection from this sort of violence.”).
See id. at 131 (discussing Suter v. Artist M, 503 U.S. 347 (1992), in which the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the right of foster children to bring a federal suit to enforce the reasonable efforts provision against the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services because the provision was too ambiguous to enforce).
See id. at 132 (citing one guardian’s testimony before Congress).
See id. at 132–33 (discussing an investigation by the U.S. General Accounting Office into
how a Florida county implemented the AFSA).
See 42 U.S.C. § 673b(a) (2006)(“[T]he Secretary shall make a grant to each State that is
an incentive-eligible State for a fiscal year in an amount equal to the adoption incentive
payment payable to the State under this section for the fiscal year, which shall be payable
in the immediately succeeding fiscal year.”).
Id. § 673b(d)(1)(A). Incentives for other adoptions, such as older child adoptions, may
be of a different amount.
Id. §§ 673b(b)(2), (g)(3). Two base numbers are in place. The first concerns the number of foster children adoptions. Here, the base number is the number of such adoptions
in the state for the year 2007. As for the base number of older children adoptions, that
too is the number of such adoptions in the state during 2007. However, the state is eligi-
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This system encourages states to continuously exceed the number of
85
adoptions from one year to the next, but does not at all incentivize
states to preserve families. Consequently, states would understanda86
bly privilege adoptions over family preservation.
The Louisiana Supreme Court well articulated the relationship
between ASFA and state law, stating: “The ASFA tilts th[e] delicate
balance [between the natural parent’s fundamental right and the
child’s right to a permanent home] in the child’s favor and requires
states, as a condition to continued receipt of certain federal funding,
87
to enact parallel legislation.” As a result, states are often exempt
from working with the family toward reunification, and the burden to
prove parental fitness shifts to the parent who wishes to maintain her
88
parental rights.
2. State Law and Parents with Mental Disorders: An Overview
As a general matter, though specifics vary across jurisdictions,
most states consider a parent’s mental disorder grounds for removal
or termination of parental rights when that mental disorder results in
the parent’s inability to care for her child. Some states express this
view in their statutory schemes. These statutes explicitly state that a
mental illness ought to be considered by courts in removal proceedings if the mental illness renders a parent unable to care for the
child. Among these states are Arizona and Kansas. Other states,
however, do not have such statutes and regard a parent’s mental illness as reason for removal or termination as fitting the child’s best
interest, as does the District of Columbia.
One state where a parent’s mental illness is grounds for termination is Arizona. This state’s statute instructs courts to terminate pa-

85

86
87
88

ble for additional funding if it exceeds its highest number of adoptions in the state in a
single year since 2002. To be clear, let us assume that State X has released 1000 children
for adoption in 2007. Let us assume further that since 2002 the most adoptions in that
state in a single year have been 1500. To qualify for a federal grant in 2009, State X
would have to release more than 1000 children for adoption. However, for a higher
grant, State X would have to release more than 1500 children for adoption in 2009.
Continuing the illustrative calculations above: assuming State X has indeed exceeded its
base number in 2009 by releasing more than 1500 children for adoption (let us say the
number of children adopted in State X in 2009 is 2000), the highest number of adoptions
ever that qualifies State X for the increased grant in pursuant years will become 2000.
Thus, in order to maximize funding, states are incentivized to continually increase the
number of adoptions. ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 111.
See id.
State ex rel. SNW v. Mitchell, No. 01-2128, 2001 La. LEXIS 3105, at *14 (Nov. 28, 2001).
Id. at *14–22.
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rental rights of a mentally ill or deficient parent, if the parent is unable to perform parental responsibilities and if that inability is likely
89
to persist over an indeterminate period of time. An Arizona court
has interpreted this statute as mandatory; when clear and convincing
evidence exists that a parent does in fact have a mental illness, that
the parent cannot care for the child because of the mental illness and
that this inability to care is persistent over time, the court has no dis90
cretion and must terminate the child-parent relationship.
Similarly to the Arizona statute, Kansas too has instructed courts
through its law to consider a parent’s mental illness as a factor in
91
terminations of parental rights. Here, the mental illness must be of
such nature or duration that it would eliminate the parent’s ability to
92
care for the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the
situation must be one that is unlikely to change in the foreseeable fu93
ture. Indeed, mental illness alone cannot satisfy the conditions for
94
terminations. In In re J.Y., the Kansas Court of Appeals reaffirmed
the lower court’s termination of the father’s rights. Rather than the
father’s mental illness, the court of appeals based its decision on the
father’s criminal record, his failure to comply with rehabilitation efforts and his failure to care for the child. The court reasoned that
the state provided no evidence to support a claim that the father’s bi95
polar disorder had any effect on his parenting ability.
The District of Columbia’s statutory scheme provides that termi96
nation decisions are made on the basis of the child’s best interests,
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

96

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B)(3) (2009).
In re Appeal in Pinal County, 729 P.2d 918, 920 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269(b)(1) (2008).
Id.
Id. § 38-2269(a).
191 P.3d 1137, No. 100,214, 2008 WL 4239122 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at *2 (“The court provided no reasoning for choosing this factor, merely stating the
natural father had been incapable of caring for J.Y. While the record contained evidence
the natural father had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder as a juvenile, no evidence
provided by the State demonstrated the effect this disorder might have on the natural father’s ability to parent or the persistence of the natural father’s disability. Consequently,
the evidence does not support a finding the natural father currently possesses an emotional or mental illness or disability that renders him incapable of parenting J.Y.”).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2353 (2001). The District of Columbia statute’s language reads:
(b) In determining whether it is in the child’s best interests that the parent and
child relationship be terminated, a judge shall consider each of the following factors: (1) the child’s need for continuity of care and caretakers and for timely integration into a stable and permanent home, taking into account the differences in
the development and the concept of time of children of different ages; (2) the
physical, mental and emotional health of all individuals involved to the degree
that such affects the welfare of the child, the decisive consideration being the
physical, mental and emotional needs of the child; (3) the quality of the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent, siblings, relative,
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without specifically regarding parental mental illness as a factor.
While courts agree that mental illness in itself is not grounds for termination of parental rights, it is a consideration when the illness im97
pacts the child’s well-being. In E.C. v. District of Columbia, the D.C.
Court of Appeals affirmed a termination of the parents’ rights using
the best interest framework. In this case, based on testimonies from
psychiatrists, social workers and family members, the court found that
98
the parents’, particularly the father’s, mental condition had a poten99
tial adverse effect on the three young children. The court concluded that the father was both emotionally and physically dangerous
to his children for two reasons. First, his disorder could cause irreversible emotional damage to the children who already suffered developmental impairments. Second, the court was concerned with the
lack of attachments between the parents and the children, which was
so severe that the children exhibited distress and behavioral prob100
lems after visits with the parents, including self-injurious behavior.
Another state that adopts a framework similar to the best interest
101
model is Louisiana. Although the Louisiana statute does not explicitly use the term “child’s best interest,” its language effectively creates
such a standard by prescribing that courts consider in their termination decisions the child’s age and “need for a safe, stable, and per102
manent home.”
To summarize, states generally require termination of parental
rights on three basic necessary conditions: (a) a parent’s mental illness; (b) a parent’s inability to care for her child; (c) causality be-

97
98

99
100
101
102

and/or caretakers, including the foster parent; (3A) the child was left by his or her
parent, guardian, or custodian in a hospital located in the District of Columbia for
at least 10 calendar days following the birth of the child, despite a medical determination that the child was ready for discharge from the hospital, and the parent,
guardian, or custodian of the child has not taken any action or made any effort to
maintain a parental, guardianship, or custodial relationship or contact with the
child; (4) to the extent feasible, the child’s opinion of his or her own best interests
in the matter; and (5) evidence that drug-related activity continues to exist in a
child’s home environment after intervention and services have been provided . . . . Evidence of continued drug-activity shall be given great weight.
589 A.2d 1245, 1249 (D.C. 1991).
Id. at 1247 (discussing the father’s mental state, the court cited a psychiatrist who found
the father suffered from a “character disorder which caused him to view everyone around
him with deep suspicion and to deny any personal responsibility for events in his life, and
hindered his ability to have any insight into his problems”). The court also referred to a
counseling psychologist who testified that the father’s disorder manifested in his inability
to organize his life and to meet his responsibilities. Id. at n.5.
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1247–49.
See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015 (2008).
Id. at art. 1015(5).
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tween the illness and the inability to care. However, other common
considerations for termination are the parent’s prospects at improvement and recovery and the child best interest model. In Subparts C.iii and C.iv.1–3 below, I discuss in greater detail how these
conditions work to disadvantage parents with mental disorders. In
Virginia, the jurisdiction on which I focus hereafter, once condition
(a) applies, there is a presumption that conditions (b) and (c) exist
as well. This presumption increases the risk that parents will lose custody of their children, which is an infringement on their fundamental
rights. Virginia, therefore, is both representative of most states’
treatment of parents with mental disorders and an example that
highlights how state law overly burdens such parents.
3. Virginia Law—Obstacles to Family Preservation
The State of Virginia intervenes in families when a child is abused
103
or neglected. Defining abuse or neglect, Virginia law stipulates that
a child left without parental care because of a parent’s mental inca104
pacity is a neglected child. When there is concern that a child has
been neglected or abused, a social services agency may remove the
child immediately from her home and petition, within four hours, for
105
a court issued emergency removal order.
For a court to grant an
order, the petition must establish that returning the child home
would likely place the child in imminent danger of life or of severe or
106
irreversible injury.
Additionally, the petition must show that reasonable efforts to prevent removal have been made, and that there
was no less drastic alternative to removal that would ensure the rea107
sonable protection of the child.
When there is no reasonable opportunity to provide these or other services, it is assumed that reason108
able efforts to prevent removal have been made.

103

104
105
106
107

108

Virginia law defines an abused or neglected child as a child whose parent or caretaker
inflicts, threatens to inflict or facilitates non-accidental mental or physical harm, substantial risk of death, disfigurement or impairment of bodily or mental functions; neglects or
refuses to provide care necessary for the child’s health; abandons the child; commits or
allows unlawful sexual acts upon the child; leaves the child with a registered violent sex
offender; or a child left without parental care. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(1)–(6)
(2009).
See id. § 16.1-228(5).
See id. § 16.1-251(A).
See id. § 16.1-251(A)(1).
See id. § 16.1-251(A)(2). The statute suggests less drastic alternatives such as “medical,
educational, psychiatric, psychological, homemaking or other similar services to the child
or family.”
See id. § 16.1-251(A)(2).
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Once a child is placed in the custody of social services or a child
welfare agency, and unless the child has been returned to the custody
of her parents, the department of social services must design a foster
109
care plan.
After approving a foster care plan, courts must review
110
the plan at least twice.
Just as ASFA directs, Virginia too requires the child’s health and
safety to be the highest priority for the agency devising a foster care
111
plan and for the court reviewing and approving it. Also, like ASFA,
Virginia requires that the plan support reasonable efforts to return
the child to her parents within the shortest feasible amount of time,
providing that reunification is consistent with the child’s health and
112
safety. However, the agency is not required to make reasonable efforts to reunite the child with her parent if the parent has previously
lost parental rights over a sibling or if the parent has been convicted
of other crimes—generally different types of homicide or violent
113
crimes against children.
The court may terminate parental rights when a child has been
abused or neglected and has been placed in foster care if termination
114
is in the best interest of the child. Before looking into the child’s
best interest, however, threshold conditions must be met: that the
abuse or neglect must have seriously and substantially threatened the
115
child’s life, health or development; and that it is not reasonably
likely that the abuse or neglect would have ended, therefore ensuring
116
the child’s safe return home in reasonable time.

109

110

111
112
113
114
115
116

See id. § 16.1-281(A). The agency should involve the parent and child—provided that the
child’s involvement is in her best interest—and has sixty days (and in some circumstances
an additional sixty days) for designing the plan. The plan should specify: (a) the programs, care, services and other support to the child and parents; (b) the participation
and conduct required from the parents; (c) the permitted visitations or other contacts
between the child and parents; (d) the nature of the child’s placement; and (e) if the
child is 16 or over, programs and services to help the child prepare for independent living. Id. § 16.1-281(B).
A court is to hold a hearing in order to review and approve a plan within seventy-five days.
At this hearing, a judge has the authority to revise a foster care plan. See id. § 16.1-281(C).
Following approval of a plan, the court is to schedule another review hearing in six
months, unless the effects and results of the plan are equivalent to those of termination
of parental rights, in which case the court is to schedule a review hearing in twelve
months. See id. § 16.1-281(E).
See id. § 16.1-281(B).
See id.
See id.
See id. § 16.1-283(B).
See id. § 16.1-283(B)(1).
See id. § 16.1-283(B)(2).
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Most important for our purposes, the law creates a presumption
that a parent’s mental illness excludes the likelihood of a child’s safe
return home into the custody of her parents. The presumption exists
when a parent has a mental illness that is severe enough to eliminate
a reasonable expectation for a parent’s ability to care for the child in
a manner appropriate with the child’s age and developmental
117
stage.
This statutory framework disadvantages parents with mental illness
in several ways. First, by making an explicit connection between a
parent’s mental incapacity and neglect, the statute lowers the general
standard of neglect. When a parent has no mental illness, an agency
must show that the child has been, or is currently, at risk of harm or
death, or that the child is without care that is necessary for her
118
health. Yet, when the parent has a mental illness no such showing
is required; instead it is sufficient that a child is without parental
119
care regardless of whether the lack of care places the child in risk
or if the absent care is necessary for her health. Thus, when a child
has a parent with a mental illness, the threshold for a court finding
that the child has been neglected is lower. Rather than turning on
the harm to the child, the standard—which is no longer neutral—
now turns on the parent’s mental capacity.
While the statute itself creates a disparate standard, courts have
further exacerbated this disparity. In Jenkins v. Winchester Department
120
of Social Services, a mother with paranoid-schizophrenia, who had
her parental rights over three older children terminated, appealed
the termination of parental rights to a younger boy and girl. Contesting the termination of her rights regarding her daughter, who was
121
removed immediately after birth, Jenkins argued that as the child
was removed so early, there was no actual finding of abuse or neglect.
Therefore, Jenkins argued, her rights should not have been terminated. The court found Jenkins’s illness rendered her incapable of
122
being an independent parent and therefore posed a substantial risk
to her children. The court interpreted “substantial risk” as relating to
123
a future possibility that indeed may not materialize. Thus, based on
117
118
119
120
121
122

123

See id. § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a).
See id. § 16.1-228(1)–(6).
See id. § 16.1-228(5).
409 S.E.2d 16 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18–19. The court did not specify what it meant by “independent parent,” but seems
to imply that an independent parent is one who does not require constant and frequent
supervision or assistance from others, particularly from the Department of Social Services.
Id.
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her mental illness, the court presumed that Jenkins could not care
124
for her daughter. Furthermore, the court presumed that she eventually would present a risk because the court did not believe there was
a reasonable possibility that Jenkins’ parenting would improve.
Thus, not only does the court assume that a parent is unfit because of a mental illness, but it also subjects a parent who suffers from
a mental illness to a higher standard of parenting than it does men125
tally healthy parents.
In regards to her son, Jenkins argued that,
pursuant to her participation in social services, her parenting abilities
had improved enough that she no longer presented a substantial risk
126
to him. However, the court ruled this was insufficient, and despite
127
the progress she had made, Jenkins would have to show that she
could function as an independent parent if she were to reverse a ter128
mination decision and regain custody. Notably, this “independent
parent” standard is a standard that has no root in the language of the
statute. Moreover, being an “independent parent” is not expected of
mentally healthy parents. Arguably, other parents are encouraged to
share parental responsibilities with their extended families and communities rather than shoulder the burdens of parenting on their
own. The result is that the standard for the state to remove a child is
lower, yet the standard for a parent to regain rights is elevated. A
child of a parent with a mental illness, then, is more likely to be removed from her home and a parent’s custody, and less likely to be
reunited with that parent.
A second way in which Virginia law hinders mentally ill parents is
129
by limiting reunification services. As a way to comply with ASFA,
Virginia law excuses a social services agency from making reasonable
efforts at reunification when a parent’s parental rights to a sibling

124

125

126
127
128
129

Id. at 19 (“Ms. Jenkins’ mental incapacity prevented her from rendering appropriate parental care.”). For another example of a case where the court concludes that a mental
illness means a parent is unfit, see Marston v. Fairfax County Department of Family Services,
No. 1336-01-4, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 26 (Jan. 22, 2002).
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 190 (“[M]any judges apply a higher standard of parental
competence that is more appropriate for divorce custody cases than for termination of
parental rights.”).
Jenkins, 409 S.E.2d at 20.
Note that when discussing her daughter, the court maintained that there was no evidence
of improvement in Jenkins’s parenting skills.
Id.
See Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 616 S.E.2d 765, 772 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (pointing out the provision regarding reasonable services has been amended to conform to the
federal statute).
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130

have been previously terminated.
Given the high rate of termination of rights of parents with mental illness, this allows agencies not
to provide services to parents with mental illness. A case in point is
131
Toms v. Hanover Department of Social Services, where the court reviewed a lower court’s decision to terminate a father’s parental rights
over his severely neglected and underdeveloped children. The fa132
ther, diagnosed with multiple severe mental health problems, argued that the state could not terminate his parental rights because he
133
was not provided with reasonable services. The court analyzed the
language regarding reasonable services and concluded that the state
had discretion—not an obligation—to provide services even when the
law does not explicitly release the state from its responsibility to pro134
vide services.
Addressing the issue of parental mental health, the
court found that “another example of prima facie evidence (severe
‘mental or emotional illness’) . . . includes no mention of rehabilitative services, [therefore] it cannot be reasonably asserted that the
135
subsection necessarily requires them in all cases.”
This ruling by the court is troubling for two reasons. First, by releasing agencies from the obligation to provide services to those parents who are presumably most in need of such services, the law once
more increases the risk that children will remain separated from their
parents and that these parents’ rights will eventually be terminated.
This raises concerns that the denial of services to parents who are
mentally ill could ultimately reproduce their unfitness and failure as
parents. Second, courts that are required to evaluate a parent’s ability to remedy the abuse, neglect or unfitness are without means to
make such judgments. Absent these services and the opportunity to
demonstrate to the court that services are both beneficial to parents
and protective to the child, or that the abuse or neglect has ended in
a way that will facilitate the child’s safe return home in reasonable
136
time (as the termination provision suggests), parents are denied the
130

131
132

133
134
135
136

VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-281(B) (2008). This was also one of the court’s findings in Jenkins,
that because she had lost custody over her older children, she presented a risk to her
younger children. Jenkins, 409 S.E.2d at 21.
616 S.E.2d 765 (2005).
Id. at 768. Psychological testing revealed that Toms suffered from episodes of delusional
thinking, social phobias, paranoia, severe anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, depression and avoidant personality features. He also acknowledged that he suffered from alcohol abuse. Some of these have symptoms common to schizophrenia, such as the delusions and paranoia.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 770–71.
Id. at 771 n.4.
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(2) (2008).
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opportunity for a less drastic alternative to removal and termination.
Nor do parents have the chance to avoid separation from their children altogether. Moreover, services enable both caseworkers and
courts to evaluate different factors that could implicate the child’s
best interest, her ability to cope with the separation, to address any
special needs the child may have and to estimate whether in fact the
137
child is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated. As I
will argue in the following Parts, this is inconsistent with parents’ and
children’s substantive due process rights, as it creates a heightened
risk that a child removed from her parent’s custody will remain separated from the home when removal progresses to termination of parental rights.
The third and most detrimental way the law compromises the parental rights of parents with mental illness is the presumption that a
parent’s mental illness diminishes the likelihood of a child’s safe re138
The presumption becomes almost unrebuttable when
turn home.
courts find that a diagnosis alone is sufficient to deem a parent un139
As demonstrated in Jenkins, this presumption creates a default
fit.
that a parent with mental illness should not retain her parental rights
since because of her illness—and her illness alone—she cannot, and
will not in the future be able to care for her child. In another case,
140
Helen W. v. Fairfax County Department of Human Development, the
court ruled that the parents’ mental illness (both parents shared a
common system of paranoid delusions) and their poor prognosis
141
were sufficient for a finding of unfitness.
In ruling so, the court
held that a finding regarding a mental illness and a poor prognosis
was “tantamount to a finding of parental unfitness and [that] no sep142
arate finding of unfitness was necessary.” Thus, not only is the state
agency exempt from showing that the rights of a parent with mental
illness should be terminated, but this presumption places the burden
on the parent to show that those rights should not be terminated.
What’s more, the state leaves the parent without resources to demonstrate that her rights should not be terminated because she had been

137

138
139

140
141
142

See Nina Wasow, Planned Failure: California’s Denial of Reunification Services to Parents with
Mental Disabilities, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 218–19 (2006) (discussing the
“reasonable efforts” phase of dependency proceedings).
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a).
See Wasow, supra note 137, at 221 (“Many judges, in denying services or terminating
rights, simply point to the diagnosis as if it were evidence enough of inability to parent . . . .”).
407 S.E.2d 25 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 30.
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previously denied access to services which could have served as a less
restrictive alternative to removal, or could have enabled her to become a fit parent.
4. The Inadequacy of Current Interventions
Beyond the previously discussed shortcomings of the federal and
Virginia frameworks, these interventions also are inadequate because
they fail to properly address the particular circumstances of parents
with mental illness. First, while removal, reunification and termination revolve around mental illness and its impact on the parent’s fitness, the law does not address how mental illness is to be assessed.
Presumably, assessment is the role of social science professionals in
their service to the courts, yet social science too struggles with the
143
problem of assessment in legal contexts.
Second, as much as the law attaches parental mental illness to parental unfitness, it also conflates severity of mental illness with permanency. Once a court finds a parent unfit merely because of that
parent’s mental illness, the court is also more likely to conclude
144
(sometimes with no in-depth scrutiny) that the illness is chronic,
and the parent, therefore, permanently unfit. A poor prognosis of
the parent’s improvement justifies, in the eyes of the court, the termination of parental rights.
Lastly, both in statute and in court implementation, there seems
to be an assumption that a child’s best interest is to be separated
from a mentally ill parent that is abusive or neglectful. Here, too, social science research, as well as the conditions of child welfare, raise
hard questions as to whether a child’s best interest points to family
separation and out of home care.
a. Assessing Parental Fitness
Parenting skills, or parental fitness, are subject to the law’s scrutiny primarily when disputes between parents or disputes between
parents and the state arise. Relevant here are challenges brought by
the state—upon moving for removal or termination of parental
rights—to the parental fitness of a parent with schizophrenia. Yet social scientists have challenged the adequacy of evaluations of parental
fitness upon which courts rely, arguing that parents with mental ill-

143
144

See infra Part C.4.a.
See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
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ness lose their children due to inadequate and inappropriate assess145
ments.
The problems with assessment stem from the tools social services
use to identify mental illness and parental fitness. Because there are
no formal guidelines or standards for assessment of parental mental
146
illness, some of these tools, specifically personality tests, are inap147
propriate for assessing fitness, while others do not test parenting
148
The efficacy of these tools in determining fitness reskills at all.
149
mains insufficiently tested.
Assessments of parental fitness may also reflect assessors’ bias toward individual parents, for which the inadequate tools are unable to
control. While mental health professionals conducting assessments
tend to predict poor prognoses, the actual outcomes of treatment are
150
more positive, thus inconsistent with the prognosis.
Also, it seems
that low socio-economic status is predictive of severe diagnoses and
151
poor prognoses. This is a bias that reproduces the disadvantages to
parents with mental health problems as well as parents from low socio-economic backgrounds and particularly those at the intersection.
Finally, out of concern to children’s safety and well-being, assessors
tend to over-estimate the risk a parent may present in a preference to
152
err on the safe side.
Still, however deficient assessment tools may be, they are preferable to a complete lack of assessment, as was the case in Datta v. Fair153
fax Department of Family Services. There, Datta appealed the Virginia
145

146
147

148
149

150

151
152

153

See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 190 (“[M]any mentally ill parents risk loss of their parental
rights on the basis of inadequate or inappropriate assessment methods and professional
bias.”).
See Busch & Redlich, supra note 50, at 999 (“There are no formal practice standards to
assess parental mental health or parental fitness . . . .”).
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 190 (“[P]rofessionals and judges continue to rely on personality tests and other assessment tools that may be inappropriate for this population in
determining parenting competence.”).
See Wasow, supra note 137, at 211 (discussing the flaws in psychological assessment of parental adequacy and child mistreatment risk).
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 190 (“Psychological instruments that are typically used for
child welfare assessments have received little empirical testing regarding their efficacy for
measuring parenting competence.”).
See Wasow, supra note 137, at 212 (discussing a study conducted by attorney Bruce Ennis
and psychologist Thomas Litwack which found a poor correlation between prognosis and
actual outcome of treatment).
See id. (“[P]erceived lower socio-economic status correlates directly with more severe diagnosis and poorer prognosis . . . .”).
See id. (“[P]sychologists have a significant tendency towards over-prediction of violent behavior in civil commitments, which is a problem in child welfare cases.” (citation omitted)).
No. 0293-06-4, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 394 (Aug. 22, 2006).
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circuit court’s decision to remove her son, arguing the court erred in
154
finding she had a “mental incapacity.” Neither the circuit court nor
the court of appeals based their rulings on a mental health assessment conducted by a mental health professional. Rather, both courts
based their findings on witnesses’ descriptions of the mother’s behav155
ior, as well as her medical history. Therefore, the court of appeals
ruled that the circuit court did not err in concluding Datta had a
156
mental incapacity.
This finding of Datta’s mental incapacity rests on shaky ground
for two reasons. For one, according to social science research, because of the inadequacy of assessment tools, caseworkers find it difficult to identify who is mentally ill or an unfit parent due to mental
157
Second, even a history of psychiatric treatment
health problems.
can be misleading. Keeping in mind that the course of mental illness
varies significantly among patients, includes periods of remission and
158
can, in some cases, lead to complete recovery, relying only on medical history with no inquiry into the individual’s current mental health
is insufficient. In the context of removal of children from their par159
ents’ custody—a burden on a fundamental right —a finding of mental illness without proper assessment is highly troubling.
Even when a mental illness has been correctly identified, it is a
poor proxy for unfitness. A series of studies suggest that parental fit160
ness hinges on many factors, less than on the diagnosis itself. These
factors range from a parent’s intellectual and social competence,
161
parenting practices and the severity of symptoms.
Courts should
therefore examine the actual parenting style, the particular symptoms
a parent experiences, and their impact on the child and on parenting
154
155

156
157

158

159
160
161

Id. at *2.
Id. at *10 (“No witness opined that Datta was suffering from a particular mental disease.
Rather, the witnesses described her attitude toward others and her uncommon behavior. . . . Datta believed she was being followed or she spoke to persons who were not present. She exhibited aggressive behavior, which included threatening [the child’s] family
and social workers. . . . [She] had a history of mental hospitalization and she took psychiatric medications . . . .”).
Id.
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 189 (citing a study that found that “child welfare workers
perceived themselves ill equipped to deal with assessment and treatment of the mentally
ill parents they serve”).
See Assen Jablensky, Course and Outcome of Schizophrenia, in 1 NEW OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY, supra note 18, at 612, 619 (“[S]chizophrenia presents a broad spectrum of
possible outcomes and course patterns . . . .”).
For a discussion of parents’ custody rights, as well as family integrity, as fundamental
rights, see Part II.
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 190 (listing such studies).
See id.
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skills, rather than rely only on the diagnosis itself. In light of these
studies, it seems that the ruling in Datta was not in fact incorrect, because a particular diagnosis seems immaterial. Had the court analyzed the impact of Datta’s mental incapacity or her actual parental
fitness, perhaps this argument would have merit. The court, however, merely presented facts it saw as demonstrative of Datta’s unfitness—it did not address whether there existed a causal connection
between Datta’s mental incapacity and her supposed inability to pro162
vide appropriate mental care for her son.
b. Assuming Permanency: Requiring a ‘Poor Prognosis’
As part of a termination of parental rights proceeding, Virginia
courts examine the parent’s prognosis for recovery. A decision to
terminate must be based on the court’s finding that prospects for improvement are poor, and that as a result, the abuse or neglect are un163
likely to be remedied in a reasonable time. This “poor prognosis”
requirement is rooted in a view that severe mental illness is chronic
and immutable and that, as such, mental illness permanently pre164
cludes one from being a competent parent. The “poor prognosis”
requirement highlights the lack of understanding among lawmakers
and courts about the nature of mental illness, specifically recovery or
remission prospects. Although individuals may recover even from severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, or at least experience
165
periods of remission, the existence of a mental illness in itself
serves, again, as a proxy—this time for little chances of future mental
health.
166
For example, in Hayes v. Petersburg Department of Social Services,
parental rights were terminated despite the fact that the father, suffering from schizophrenia, had been receiving rehabilitative services
and therapy, though the father had sought out services later than
167
proscribed in the foster care plan. The court held that despite the
father receiving services, it was not in the child’s best interest to have
to wait a long period of time to “find out when, or even if, a parent

162
163
164

165
166
167

Datta v. Fairfax Dep’t of Family Servs., No. 0293-06-4, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 394, at *10
(Aug. 22, 2006).
See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (B)(2)(a) (2008).
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 188 (describing how researchers view a parent’s mental disorder as “an immutable problem that inevitably undermines the ability to be an effective
parent”).
See Jablensky, supra note 158, at 619.
No. 1166-05-2, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 431 (Nov. 1, 2005).
Id. at *8.
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will be capable of resuming his [] responsibilities.” In light of the
purpose of the foster care system as a temporary, yet oftentimes prolonged, solution for children whose parents are unable to care for
169
them, the logic flowing from this ruling is puzzling. If it is not in
the best interest of children to wait for their parents to be able to
parent them again, why the need for foster care as an intermediate
period of time until adoption? What’s more, a parent’s capability to
parent is contingent upon the services she receives while her child is
in foster care, yet these services take time to be effective in achieving
remission or recovery. Why, then, provide these services, which arguably are a strain on public resources? If, according to the court,
children should not have to wait for their parents to become fit parents, it would follow that every child removed from her unfit parents
should be released for adoption immediately. This ruling is highly
under-protective of both parents’ rights to the custody of their children and their interest in receiving mental health services, as well as
children’s right to family integrity.
c. Determining the Child’s Best Interest
In most matters of family law concerning children, the law instructs courts to consider the best interest of the child. This is true
also regarding removal of children or termination of parental rights.
Indeed, both ASFA and Virginia law emphasize the child’s best inter170
est as a guiding principle. However, the “best interest of the child”
is an individualized, context-based standard that scholars have criti171
cized for being too vague. Perhaps, then, a different concept is in
order. While one would be hard pressed to contest that protection
from abuse or neglect is inconsistent with the child’s best interest,
this should not be the only set of circumstances taken into account.

168
169

170

171

Id. at *9 (quoting Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 394 S.E.2d 492, 495
(Va. Ct. App. 1990)).
See Cristina Chi-Young Chou, Renewing the Good Intentions of Foster Care: Enforcement of the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the Substantive Due Process Right to Safety,
46 VAND. L. REV. 683, 683 (1993) (“The purpose of foster care is to provide a temporary
safe haven for children whose parents are unable to care for them.”).
ASFA prioritizes the child’s “health and safety.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2006). Virginia
law considers the child’s best interest both in designing a foster plan, see VA. CODE ANN. §
16.1-281(B) (2009), and in termination of parental rights, see id. § 16.1-283 (B).
See Virginia Sawyer Radding, Intention v. Implementation: Are Many Children, Removed from
Their Biological Families, Being Protected or Deprived?, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 29, 35–
36 (2001) (discussing how some scholars believe the “best interests of the child” standard
is vague due to nonexistent guiding criterion and because its application is “vulnerable to
biases”).

Mar. 2010]

DUE PROCESS THROUGH COMPREHENSIVE CARE

815

Rather, I propose a wider view of the standard that examines not only
the child’s home life, but the impact of removal or termination and
the legal proceedings which they involve, as well as the conditions
and effects of foster care.
When parents with mental illness are concerned, an inquiry into
the child’s best interest often involves a discussion of the parent’s
172
condition, and how that condition relates to the child. But a finding of a parent’s mental illness does not necessarily compromise the
child’s best interest. In fact, research regarding the harms of parental schizophrenia on children reveals that the likelihood and severity
of attention deficits or thought disorders, common in children of
parents with schizophrenia, worsen with separation from the parent.
Similarly, mental illness rates among children not raised by their parents are higher than those among children who remained in their
173
mothers’ custody.
Separation from parents further implicates the child’s best interest because it loosens—even breaks—the ties of attachment. According to attachment theory, children’s bonds with a primary care-giver
174
are necessary for healthy psychological development. Through an
ongoing, long-term relationship with parents, children learn how to
face the world and forge their own identity by either imitating or re175
jecting their parents as role models. Breaking the child-parent relationship causes severe trauma to children and can hinder their de176
velopment. And though children can form these attachments with
more than one caretaker, when forced to separate from their attach177
ment figures, they still suffer emotional harm, including lessened
emotional security, lower self-esteem and a decreased ability to form

172
173

174
175

176
177

See e.g., Hayes, 2005 Va. App. LEXIS 431; Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
348 S.E.2d 13 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
See Jacqueline Barnes & Alan Stein, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, in 2 NEW OXFORD
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 18, at 1848, 1850 (“A longitudinal comparison of
children reared with or apart from their schizophrenic mother found that the rate of psychopathology was in fact marginally higher in the group reared apart than those who had
stayed with their mothers.”).
See ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 106 (“[C]hildren’s relationships with a caregiver is essential
to normal psychological development.”).
See ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY
OWES PARENTS 5 (2004) (“Parents also provide lasting role models which older children
can begin to identify with—and which teenagers can reject, safe in the knowledge that
the parent will not leave.”).
See id. (“[H]ealthy emotional development requires a close and enduring relationship
with one or more parental figures.”).
See ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 106 (“[M]oving children after [bonds of attachment] have
formed causes serious emotional damage.”).
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178

relationships.
Additional psychological wounds can occur as a re179
Separation
sult of separation from siblings and extended family.
from family, particularly due to termination of parental rights, carries
legal ramifications, such as the loss of a claim to support or inheri180
tance, or the loss of the child’s right to voice her position regarding
parents’ medical treatment. Participating in medical decisions is a
highly significant right in the context of parents who are mentally ill
because, on occasion, the parent may not be competent or capable of
informed consent regarding her own medical treatment.
Despite adoption being the ultimate goal of termination and foster care, a significant number of children are not adopted, are moved
181
between multiple placements (“foster care drift”), and may reach
the age of majority while still in foster care, thereby “aging out” of the
182
foster system. For children of parents with mental illness, never being adopted is highly likely because of the special needs of most of
183
these children.
It should also be noted that when a child is removed from her home, and certainly when she is subjected to foster
care drift, her education is affected as well. For example, changes in
foster placement may result in changes in schools, compromises in
educational placements or disturbances to school attendance. Adjustment to new educational settings may hamper academic achievement and break important social ties. Finally, children may be placed
in unsuitable special education settings or not receive special educa184
tion services at all.
The most important cause yet for misgivings about foster care’s
consistency with a child’s best interest is the staggering number of

178

179

180
181

182
183
184

See Wasow, supra note 137, at 219 (maintaining that continual contact with biological parents, even while in foster care, benefits children’s emotional security, self-esteem and relationship skills).
See Radding, supra note 171, at 31 (explaining how “years of bouncing among temporary
living situations” may destroy emotional bonds with “parents, siblings, grandparents and
extended family”).
See id. at 31–32 (“[S]evering a child’s ties to his natural parents result in the child’s loss of
his rights to be supported by them and to inherit from them.”).
See Sarah Ramsey, Fixing Foster Care or Reducing Child Poverty: The Pew Commission Recommendations and the Transracial Adoption Debate, 66 MONT. L. REV. 21, 24–25 (2005)
(“[M]any children suffer[] multiple placements over a lengthy period, with some being
lost in the foster care system. They [are] caught in . . . foster care ‘drift’ or ‘limbo.’”).
See Wasow, supra note 137, at 219 (stating that many children become legal orphans for a
significant period of time, many until they reach majority).
See id. (discussing “aging out” in the context of children with special needs).
For the harmful impact of foster care on education, see generally Sarah Hudson-Plush,
Note, Improving Educational Outcomes for Children in Foster Care: Reading the McKinney-Vento
Act’s “Awaiting Foster Care Placement” Provision to Include Children in Interim Foster Care Placements, 13 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 83 (2006).
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children abused in foster care. As many as thousands of children are
subject to abuse or neglect by their foster families. Others receive in185
adequate medical and psychological treatment while in foster care.
Children in foster care are ten times more likely to be abused than
186
children not in foster care, and that abuse tends to be more severe.
Agencies often fail in their screening, training and supervising of foster families, who in turn fail to address the likely special developmen187
tal, psychological and medical needs of the children in their care.
Perhaps this can explain why removal into foster care in itself is a risk
188
factor for a variety of mental health and behavioral problems.
Coupled with these children’s vulnerability to such problems because
of their parent’s mental state, foster care could increase mental
health harms to children. A broader take on the child’s best interest
would lead to a conclusion that a child’s mental health might benefit
189
from remaining in her parent’s care.
Finally, prolonged proceedings and extended periods of time in
foster placement may affect the outcome of the termination proceed190
191
ing. Because of changes in children’s attachment, needs, and developmental stages, their “best interests” shift with time, disadvantag192
ing parents from whom they have been separated.
A presumably
185

186

187

188

189

190

191

192

See Laura A. Harper, Note, The State’s Duty to Children in Foster Care—Bearing the Burden of
Protecting Children, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 793, 793 (2003) (“[T]housands [of children in the
foster care system] suffer abuse or neglect in foster homes and receive inadequate medical or psychological treatment or other services while in the system.”).
See id. at 796–97 (describing studies conducted by the National Foster Care Education
Project that found “rates of abuse and neglect of children in foster family care . . . to be
ten times higher than the rates for children in the general population.” The study also
found that foster children are more vulnerable to sexual abuse).
See id. at 797 (“Foster parents often receive inadequate training and lack the support system necessary to properly care for foster children, who are likely to experience unique
developmental, behavioral, and psychological problems due to previous abuse.”).
See Mason et al., supra note 6, at 1106 (“Removal of a child from the home and placement
in a foster home, in an institution, or with others is in itself an additional risk factor that
predisposes these children to a multitude of mental and behavioral problems.”).
See Barnes & Stein, supra note 173, at 1850 (“A longitudinal comparison of children
reared with or apart from their schizophrenic mother found that the rate of psychopathology was in fact marginally higher in the group reared apart than those who had
stayed with their mothers.”).
See Martin Guggenheim & Christine Gottlieb, Justice Denied: Delays in Resolving Child Protection Cases in New York, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 546, 570 (2005) (discussing the effect of
delays in child welfare cases on the child’s best interest).
See ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 106 (citing arguments that children bond with their “new
‘psychological parents’” as they are separated from their biological parents for longer periods).
See Guggenheim & Gottleib, supra note 190, at 570 (arguing that delays result in a choice
between the child residing with a biological parent or with the primary attachment figure).
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preferable outcome in which the best interest of the child would converge with her parents’ rights to raise her can be adversely altered by
193
the separation, perpetuating and reproducing the perceived harms
that brought on her removal to begin with.
Determining the child’s best interest is no easy task, and a broad
perspective, considering different factors such as the detriment
caused by separation from family and the ills of foster care, should
color the outcome of a best interest analysis. It should also be considered, as I discuss in Part II, that, despite suffering abuse or neglect
from a parent with a mental illness, the child’s best interest does not
necessarily diverge from her parent’s fundamental rights to custody.
Her best interest may in fact be served by conceptualizing family preservation as an aggregated right of both parent and child.
To sum up this Part, schizophrenia is a severe mental illness that
can, but does not necessarily at all times, adversely affect parents and
children. Under federal and Virginia law, state intervention tends to
prioritize separation of children from parents in the form of foster
care or adoption placements. These laws assume that schizophrenia
equals parental unfitness and, as such, overly burden parents with
schizophrenia. The regulations are further inadequate because of
problems in assessing mental illness, the assumption that mental illness is permanent, and a narrow view of the child’s best interest.
Still, a framework privileging removal of children from the home is
troubling not only because of the shortcomings described in this Part,
but also because it infringes on the fundamental right to family integrity and therefore implicates the federal constitutional right to substantive due process. I present the argument regarding the unconstitutionality of the family-separation framework in Part II.
II. CURRENT INTERVENTIONS—UPHOLDING SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS?
Now that I have discussed and explored the weaknesses of the current interventions of federal and Virginia law regarding parents with
mental illness, it is time to test their constitutionality through the lens
194
of substantive due process rights. Removal, and subsequent termination of parental rights, are inconsistent with substantive due process rights of both parents and children. My inquiry progresses in
three steps, according to the strict scrutiny analysis of substantive due
193
194

See id. (“The system itself is creating a harm by unnecessarily severing the child’s interest
in her parental relationship from her interest in her primary attachment.”).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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195

process rights articulated in Washington v. Glucksberg. As a foundation, I show that family preservation—that is, parents’ rights to custody of their children, and children’s right to their families’ integrity—is a fundamental right. Under a concept of aggregated rights,
parents’ rights do not conflict with children’s rights. Rather, parents’
and children’s positions share a common interest and thereby complement one another.
Next, I apply strict scrutiny to family separation. Ordinarily, strict
scrutiny is framed as the examination of the fitness between the
state’s compelling interest and its action. Put differently, courts examine whether family separation is narrowly tailored to serve the
state’s compelling interest: protection of children. However, the
remainder of this Article does not treat the strict scrutiny analysis as
one question. Rather, I separate its different elements. Because I
maintain that, similar to the child’s best interest principle, children’s
protection requires a broader view, I pay extra attention to the government’s compelling interest in protecting children from abuse and
196
neglect.
The government’s interest must be to protect children
from harm more generally. Though the importance of children’s
protection merits state intervention, this intervention must be narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s interest in order to comply with
substantive due process. I therefore proceed to focus my challenge of
current interventions on two levels: (a) the interventions are not
narrowly tailored, or least restrictive; and (b) they fail to achieve the
state’s compelling interest in protecting children.
A. Family Preservation as an Aggregated Fundamental Right
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
heightened protection from government intrusion into certain liberty
197
interests or fundamental rights.
Heightened protection requires
the state to satisfy a higher standard of interest—a compelling state
interest—in order to justify intervention. The state must also refrain
from overstepping its bounds when intervening. To warrant such

195
196

197

521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (upholding assisted-suicide ban under strict scrutiny analysis).
Courts tend to skip a rigorous analysis of child protection as a compelling interest. I do
not maintain this approach is wrong in that child protection is not a compelling interest.
My approach differs from that prevalent in the case law in that I perceive a broader view
of child protection that expands beyond merely preventing their abuse or neglect by parents. See infra Part II.B.
See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719–20 (listing protected rights beyond those specified in the
Bill of Rights).
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heightened protection, though, the relevant right subject to state intervention must be a fundamental right. A fundamental right is one
that is “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ . . . such
198
that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.’”
But are the rights we are concerned with here—parents’ rights and
children’s rights, both together and severally—fundamental rights?
1. Parents’ Fundamental Rights
Parents have been entrusted by society with the care and responsibility for the well-being of their children under the assumption that
parents—because of biological ties, societal norms and affection—are
best equipped, best situated and most driven to act in their child’s
199
best interest.
As a result, the child-parent relationship and the
process of childrearing have been privileged by the law. The law allows parents expansive liberties to raise their children as they see fit
200
in order to guarantee future citizenship.
These liberties are so
201
deeply rooted in American legal tradition that the Supreme Court
has long recognized the vast freedom parents hold in the childrearing process, framing this freedom as the parents’ right “to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control,” free of
202
state intervention.
A necessary and vital aspect of parents’ liberty in childrearing is a
203
parent’s fundamental right to custody of her child. As long as parents’ childrearing decisions are reasonable, the state does not intervene in parents’ actions, reflecting a view that procreation, custody,
and childrearing rights are central to personal autonomy and selfdetermination. Children are perceived to be an extension of one’s
self, as parenting provides an individual with the opportunity to
198
199
200

201

202

203

See id. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)).
See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 35 (2005).
See id. at 23–24 (arguing that because state value inculcation is incompatible with limits
on government intrusion on freedoms of speech and religion, broad parental latitude in
childrearing decisions is rooted in fundamental tenets of American law).
See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637, 643 (2006)
(“[R]ight to the care and custody of [one’s] child . . . . has deep historical roots and significant contemporary adherents in the legal academy; it has driven federal and state legislation and shaped legal doctrine.”).
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding Oregon Compulsory Education Act, requiring enrollment in public school in the district in which a child resided,
unconstitutional).
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”).

Mar. 2010]

DUE PROCESS THROUGH COMPREHENSIVE CARE

821

choose the way of life she prefers and raise her children accord204
ingly. Also at the core of parents’ rights to the custody and inculcation of their children is the belief that liberty mandates that children
be able to become individuals rather than be “standardize[d]”
through the exclusive instruction of the state and its public educa205
tors. It can thus be inferred that, as a matter of democracy and pluralism, parents are to be the primary care-takers of their children,
and this fundamental right is protected from state intervention, or
206
can be only subjected to highly justified and minimal interference.
Put differently, the state is severely limited in its ability to separate
207
families absent sound reason, such as parental unfitness, the inabil208
ity to care for the child, or the infliction of harm through abuse or
209
neglect.
In the context of parents with mental illness, one could argue that
such parents are (or are at least presumed by Virginia’s prima facie
210
rule to be) inherently unfit, and therefore parents’ fundamental
211
rights do not apply to them. However, in Santosky v. Kramer, the
Supreme Court ruled that mentally ill parents, like all other parents,
also have these fundamental rights to custody and childrearing.
In Santosky, the mentally ill parents challenged the termination of
their parental rights on procedural due process grounds, claiming
204

205

206

207

208
209
210

211

See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 199, at 32 (arguing that at the basis of conceptions of self in
relationships with others is parenting as an expression of “‘self-definition and moral
choice’” (citing PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FAMILY VALUES 168 (1997)).
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”).
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66–67 (2000) (overturning statute that allowed
“‘[a]ny person [to] petition the court for visitation rights at any time’” without consideration of parental opinion of the child’s best interest (citing WASH REV. CODE
§ 26.10.160(3)). Though this case examines parents’ procedural due process protections,
its analysis of parents’ fundamental rights applies to the discussion of such rights here as
well.
See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“[I]t is now firmly established that
‘freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is one of the liberties protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” (quoting Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974))).
See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 199, at 36 (pointing out that government may only interfere
when parents fail “to exercise a ‘minimum degree of care,’” which is “low”).
See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF FAMILIES 94 (1996) (stating that the purpose of child protection laws it to prevent future harm from abuse or neglect).
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(B)(2)(a) (2008) (providing that proof of severe mental illness
is prima facie evidence that conditions of neglect or abuse are not reasonably likely to be
corrected).
455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) (requiring “clear and convincing evidence” before termination of parental rights for permanent neglect).

822

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:3

that the standard the State of New York used—a “preponderance of
212
Holding that a higher stanthe evidence”—was unconstitutional.
dard of “clear and convincing evidence” was more appropriate, the
court addressed parental rights to show that because such rights are
fundamental, the burden on the state to justify termination of parental rights should be heavier, even in cases of abuse and neglect. Delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Blackmun stated:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents . . . . Even when blood relationships are
strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need
for . . . protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing
family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds,
213
it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.

This finding that parental rights, particularly when the state wishes to end the relationship completely, merit heightened protection,
led to the Court’s decision that the risk of error from a lower standard of proof was too great in the context of parental rights and
214
should thus be elevated. The Court reasoned that the risk of error
is greater for parents, which merits heightened protection of their
rights. The risk for parents is greater than that of the state because
once parental rights have been terminated in a final decision, the
termination is irreversible. The state, on the other hand, may continuously move for termination upon collecting more or better evi215
dence.
The Court also stressed that for certain disadvantaged
groups of parents (poor, undereducated or minorities), termination
proceedings carry heightened risks because of cultural or class bias,
216
which a court must help counter. This is also true for parents with
mental illness who face stigmatization that may adversely influence
217
Therefore, parents with
proceedings concerning parental rights.

212
213
214
215
216

217

Id. at 747.
Id. at 753–54.
See id. at 758 (“In parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest affected is
commanding . . . .”).
Id. at 764 (“If the State initially fails to win termination . . . it always can try once again to
cut off the parents’ rights after gathering more or better evidence.”).
Id. at 762–63 (“Because parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to
judgments based on cultural or class bias.” (internal citations omitted)).
See Wasow, supra note 137, at 221 (“A central and enduring aspect of stigmatization of
people with mental disabilities is the belief that they are violent. This belief prompts a
particularly negative response to parents with mental illnesses . . . . Such biases even affect
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mental illness are in great need of more balanced and protective adjudication that will enable the preservation of their families and relationships with their children.
2. Children’s Interest in Family Preservation
Undoubtedly, children have a right to be protected and free from
218
neglect or abuse at the hand of their parents, and are guaranteed a
219
It is reasonable, then, to view abusive or
minimal degree of care.
neglectful homes as violative of children’s rights, and family preserva220
tion as conflicting with such rights.
Yet, the protection of a child
from abuse and neglect by removal from her home may ultimately
come at a very high price to her—so much, in fact, that removal is as
221
much a violation of her rights as it is of her parents’. As I have sug222
gested previously in this Article, perhaps here, too, a broad concept
of children’s rights that goes beyond abuse and neglect by their parents is appropriate. Other considerations, such as the bond between
parent and child or the potential conditions and possible harms of
foster care, should also inform decisions about the child’s best interest.
Law and sociology professor Dorothy Roberts has maintained that
the highly intrusive aspects of ASFA that enable more removals of
children and terminations of parental rights might actually be inconsistent with children’s rights on a macro-level because children are
now more vulnerable to the ills of foster care: abuse, neglect, foster
223
drift and others.
Because such problems in the foster care system
are inconsistent with children’s rights, family preservation may not

218
219

220

221
222
223

mental health professionals, and may influence their judgments about parental fitness . . . .”).
See GUGGENHEIM ET AL., supra note 209, at 94 (declaring that child protection laws aim to
protect against abuse and neglect).
See Joel Fienberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 125 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980) (describing rights common to all children that derive from their dependence on others for basic care).
For more on the debate concerning the possible divergence of children’s rights and family preservation, see generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children’s Rights? The
Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 115–17 (1999).
See Huntington, supra note 201, at 639 (citing scholars’ and advocates’ arguments that
removal from biological parents violates children’s rights).
See supra Part I.C.4.c, where I argue for a broad concept of the child’s best interest.
See Roberts, supra note 220, at 125–28 (advocating that focus should be put on lessening
the need for removal of children from biological parents because emphasis on permanent adoption does not reduce foster care populations).
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only be in the child’s best interest but it may be an aspect of her own
224
fundamental right to remain with her parents.
Federal courts have also recognized family preservation as a
child’s right. In the due process and equal protection claims of Jor225
dan v. Jackson, the parents challenged Virginia’s removal of their
son when he was not in imminent harm of irreversible danger. In
addition to reiterating that family preservation was a fundamental
right of the parents, the court found that the child, too, had a constitutional right to the integrity of his family, infringed upon by the ex226
tended separation from his parents due to removal into foster care.
Those most concerned with protection of children may continue
to maintain that the child’s right to family preservation still is not tantamount to her fundamental right to be safe and free from abuse.
Yet, aggregating parents’ rights and children’s rights (conceiving of
both as different aspects of the same right—that of family preservation) elevates children’s rights to the level of a fundamental right that
merits strict scrutiny of any state action attempting to intervene in it.
In other words, I do not argue that child protection is insignificant,
but that a balance that privileges child protection over family preservation should be shifted to afford family protection more weight and
greater consideration to a nuanced perspective about both rights of
the child in particular cases.
3. Aggregating Rights to Family Preservation
Traditionally, in the context of abuse and neglect, parents’ rights
227
and children’s rights were considered in opposition to each other.
This need not be the case when both rights are framed in terms of
family preservation, which, as I have demonstrated in my discussion
of children’s rights and the child’s best interest, do not always conflict
with children’s protection.
Proposing a framework of couples’ aggregated rights, law professor Holning Lau explains that aggregated rights acknowledge both
the individual’s right to belong to certain social groups in which

224

225

226
227

See Huntington, supra note 201, at 651 (“[F]amily preservation reflects both parents’
rights (not to have a child removed unnecessarily) and children’s rights (not to be removed unnecessarily).”).
15 F.3d 333, 336–37 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that emergency child removal statute delaying judicial review for up to sixty-five hours did not violate parents’ due process or child’s
equal protection rights).
Id. at 351.
See Huntington, supra note 201, at 639–40 (arguing that a rights-based model perpetuates
adversarial decision-making in the child welfare system).
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membership is inherent to her identity, and the group’s own right to
228
thrive. If one’s identity, self-determination and autonomy are relational to the social groups with which she associates and that are fundamental to her self-development, then those social groups must exist
and continue to develop in order to protect the rights of the indi229
viduals in the group. Lau maintains, therefore, that the group—or
230
couple—itself holds rights that are worthy of protection.
Drawing on Lau’s aggregated rights framework, it follows that if
cultural, racial or sexual groups merit protection as rights-holding
collectives because of their contribution to identity and sense of self,
this is certainly true of families as the most immediate and significant
social network, and therefore most influential on one’s sense of self.
Family preservation, then, is the right of the family as a whole, not
just the parents’ right to the custody and rearing of their children or
the children’s right not to be separated from their parents.
A theory of family rights as a joint right of family members has al231
so been proposed by Jane Rutherford.
Rutherford argues that in
order to bridge family unity with protection of individual family
members, the law must adopt a framework that privileges family
232
rights as fundamental rights that belong to the family as a group.
She reasons that focusing on individuals’ rights within families obscures the need to protect the family as a unit from state interven233
tion. The only exception Rutherford supports is the protection of a
234
Since, in the case of
weaker party when competing rights exist.
parents with schizophrenia, though, it is not always clear who the
weaker party is—parent or child—this exception may not apply
235
here.
228

229
230

231
232
233
234
235

See Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1271, 1273 (2006) (“The basic premise of group rights—and
of the couples’ rights I propose—is that an individual’s identity is inextricably linked to
her memberships in certain social collectives. Accordingly, protecting that individual requires not only protecting her individual right to associate with those collective entities,
but also protecting those entities’ aggregate rights to develop.”)
See id. at 1281–82 (discussing transcending individualism and the individual’s right to selfdevelopment).
See id. at 1282 (“[T]o protect the individual’s right to self-development, it is imperative to
protect the . . . group on which the individual relies to develop her sense of self.” (citation omitted)).
See Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U. FLA. L.
REV. 627, 643 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 643.
Consider, in addition to the imparities caused to parents by mental illness and children’s
general position as less powerful, the possibility presented above of role reversals between
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Aggregated rights theory already informs the custody placements
of minority children. For example, Native American children are to
be placed with extended family, within their tribe or within the Na236
tive American community as much as possible. This placement preference demonstrates a recognition that protection of children can
and should be achieved while preserving Native American families or
237
tribes as a right-holding group. Put differently, the group rights of
the tribe to protect its existence and continuity are not at opposition
to the child’s right to safety and are seen as a joint interest in preserving the tribe.
In Santosky v. Kramer, Justice Blackmun seems to support aggregated rights to family preservation over adversarial views of parents’
238
rights versus children’s rights.
Justice Blackmun notes that the assumption that termination inherently benefits the child is perhaps
239
incorrect and that parents and children have common interests.
Conceptualizing family preservation as an aggregated right of
both parents and children is a wider view that manifests the convergence of parents’ rights and the child’s rights and best interest. Moving away from a framework of adversarial rights, toward that of aggregated rights, allows for an examination of children’s rights and
best interest informed by the parent-child relationship and the fam240
ily’s dynamic as a cohesive group.
As an aggregated right, family
preservation is bolstered as fundamental, not just for parents, but for
241
children as well. The argument in favor of family preservation that
is beneficial to all parties involved grows stronger, and state intervention need be more subtle. Expanding our perception of the costs
and benefits to the family as a whole can facilitate a more refined
standard of state intervention and a more nuanced solution that en-

236

237
238
239
240
241

parents and children as caregivers to each other. See Walton-Moss et al., supra note 57, at
629.
See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making About
Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 899–900 (2003) (explaining the rights
granted by the Indian Child Welfare Act).
Id.
455 U.S. 745, 766–67 (1982).
Id. at 765.
See Radding, supra note 171, at 36 (“Still others argue that the child’s best interest cannot
be evaluated independently from consideration of the primary adults.”).
Though I believe a framework of aggregated rights is most appropriate, since parents and
children have an individually recognized fundamental right to family integrity, the substantive due process argument I make in this Article does not rise or fall by accepting that
parents and children hold aggregated rights. The aggregated rights framework makes
the case for family integrity stronger, but is not the only framework upon which family integrity is based.
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sures child protection but does not impose too grave a harm to family
unity.
B. Child Protection as a Compelling State Interest
After establishing that family preservation is a fundamental right,
courts apply strict scrutiny to determine whether the state action violates the right holder’s substantive due process right. To withstand
such scrutiny, the state must show a compelling interest that is served
by the state action in question. Here, the state interest is the protection of children from abuse or neglect.
Despite the status of parental rights and family preservation as
fundamental rights, they are not absolute, and the family unit is not
242
beyond the intervention of the state. The family and thus the child
are subject to the state’s interest in the child’s life, safety and wellbeing. As parens patriae, the state bears the responsibility of being the
243
ultimate protector of abused or neglected children. Underlying the
state’s interest is that the child “be both safeguarded from abuses and
given opportunities for growth into free and independent well244
developed men and citizens.” Put differently, because of children’s
status as potential citizens who should contribute to society, the state
is entitled to protect children from harm to their physical or mental
245
health and development.
State intervention, however, should not be impetuous. In a case
discussing parental authority to deny a child medical treatment, a
California appellate court articulated the standards and considera246
tions required for the state to limit parents’ rights. To justify intervention, the court held, the state needed to meet a “serious burden”
of serving the child’s best interest. The state can satisfy this heightened burden by demonstrating the gravity of harm to the child or the
substantial likelihood of serious harm, the evaluation and risks from

242
243

244
245

246

See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he family itself is not beyond
regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty.”).
See Radding, supra note 171, at 33–34 (discussing the parens patria doctrine, “in which the
State as ultimate protector may safeguard children by invading the familial sanctum to
separate abusive and neglectful parents from their children”).
Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
See In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (Ct. App. 1979) (“Parental autonomy, however, is
not absolute. The state is the guardian of society’s basic values. Under the doctrine of
parens patriae, the state has a right, indeed, a duty, to protect children.”).
Id. The California Court of Appeals considered a case of parents refusing heart treatment to their son as a neglect case. The state argued the parents did not provide their
son with the “necessities of life.”
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247

treatment, and the child’s own preference. Applying these factors
to the context of removal or termination of parental rights, the state’s
compelling interest in protecting children from abuse or neglect
would require the state to weigh more than just the potential harm to
the child if she was left with her parents. Additional considerations,
as an analogy to medical treatment, must be the conditions of foster
care, the feasibility of reunification and the possibility and likelihood
of adoption. The state might consider the conditions of the child’s
potential placement (for instance, with a family versus in a group
home), the ramifications to the child’s education (i.e., the interruption to the child’s school attendance or educational placement), or
the child’s age, emotional and cognitive skills (as indicative of her
ability to adjust to foster care or her chances of adoption).
It should be noted, though, that the state’s interest is not limited
to the protection of children from abuse. Rather, the state has other
compelling interests in strengthening families through family preser248
vation and in distributing resources efficiently and conservatively so
249
that only useful interventions are funded. Since the state must balance both its internally conflicting interests as well as the conflict between its interest and the rights of the family, it is not only limited in
its opportunities for intervention, but also in the form and scope of
intervention. Once the state has presented its compelling interest in
protecting a child, it establishes its authority to intervene in the family. Yet, the state would still need to address the means it utilizes for
such intervention, namely separation of the family through removal
or termination, and demonstrate that such means of intervention are
consistent with substantive due process rights by being narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest. The remainder of this Article questions whether state interventions that implicate family integrity are in
fact consistent with substantive due process for two reasons. First,
these interventions do not serve the state interest; they fail to protect
the child’s best interest. Second, family separation is not the least restrictive means to ensure child protection.

247
248

249

Id.
See Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he state also shares the interest of the parent and child in their family’s integrity because the welfare of the state depends in large part upon the strength of the family.” (citation omitted)).
See generally ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 134–35 (“The availability of federal matching
funds for foster care may provide a financial incentive to remove these children from
their homes.”).
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C. Removal and Substantive Due Process—Serving the Compelling State
Interest?
When the state infringes on the fundamental right of family integrity, in addition to showing a compelling interest, the state must
demonstrate that that interest is advanced by the means the state utilizes and that these means are the least restrictive ones to serve that
250
interest. Put differently, to survive the strict scrutiny test of substantive due process and pass constitutional muster, removal of children
or termination of parental rights must achieve protection of children
251
from neglect or abuse.
However, removal or termination do not
necessarily protect children, and may perhaps even harm them. Removal or termination therefore excessively limit the right to family
integrity and could violate substantive due process. My argument,
though, should not be taken to be overly sweeping. I do not mean to
state that in all cases termination or removal are inconsistent with
substantive due process rights. I merely maintain that, under current
252
law, which already over-burdens parents with schizophrenia, courts
should be aware of the heightened risk of wrongful separations,
should exercise greater caution and should apply more in-depth scrutiny to such cases.
It is imperative that courts deeply analyze cases, because without
such examination it is questionable whether separation in fact
achieves child protection in a particular case. First, as discussed
253
above, the presumption that the existence of mental incapacity in a

250

251

252

253

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment
‘forbids the government to infringe . . . ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter
what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.’” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993))); Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977). In Moore, Justice Powell explained the appropriateness of strict scrutiny in cases concerning family preservation. “[W]hen the government
intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine
carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which
they are served by the challenged regulation.” Id.
The other prong to strict scrutiny analysis for substantive due process—that the means
utilized by the state are narrowly tailored, or the least restrictive alternative—will be discussed extensively in Part III, in which I propose PACTs as a possible, less restrictive alternative to removal or termination of parental rights.
As I discussed above in Part I.C.1, although ASFA does not explicitly address parents with
schizophrenia, its directives—particularly the financial incentives it prescribes—are the
overarching framework that creates and further reproduces states’ prioritization of removal or termination. Though this Part primarily analyzes the Virginia statutory framework, the arguments raised here regarding removal’s or termination’s failure to achieve
the state’s interest in protecting children similarly apply to removal or termination as
proscribed by ASFA.
See supra Parts I.C.4.a–b.
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parent leads to unfit parenting is misguided. Keeping in mind the
254
concerns surrounding assessment, it may be the case that a parent’s
255
Further, if
mental problems do not rise to the level of incapacity.
there is a mental incapacity, without proper assessment, it is uncertain whether such incapacity does actually lead to unfitness. Recall
that persons with schizophrenia have not been found to be more vio256
lent than people not suffering from schizophrenia, thus assumptions as to inevitability of ties between schizophrenia and abuse cannot stand. Also, recovery rates seem higher than an individual
257
prognosis may predict. Therefore, permanency of unfitness is very
uncertain, which is further reason to doubt the link between schizophrenia and unfitness and the adequacy of termination, particularly.
A court that does not look into or question the parent’s assessment is
unable to adequately conclude that a parent is unfit or abusive.
Second, separation of children from their parents may not achieve
child protection, because when courts assume that a finding (even a
wrongful one) of unfitness is sufficient for removal or termination,
these courts do not look into whether or not a child is actually
258
harmed. This assumption alone, without a showing of harm to the
child, disconnects the state’s action (i.e., removal or termination)
259
from the state’s interest. The Jenkins case is a good example of this.
Recall that in that case, the court stated that there is no need for a
260
showing of actual harm, just of a “substantial risk” of harm.
This
may seem like an adequate ruling that is consistent with the state’s
compelling interest to ensure protecting children. After all, erring
on the safe side by removing a child facing that risk could seem reasonable. However, we must remember that family integrity is a fundamental right warranting strict scrutiny. Therefore, a “risk of harm”
should not be sufficient. If a child is not harmed, there is no real
need for protecting that child (especially when parenting skills im261
prove, as was the case in Jenkins).
Separation achieves no state in254
255

256
257
258
259

260
261

See supra Part I.C.3.a.
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 190 (“Because mental illness can include a broad array of
conditions, it is erroneous to assume that all mothers or fathers who have a diagnosed
mental disorder are alike.”).
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See Wasow, supra note 137, at 212–13 (“[A] poor correlation exists between prognosis and
actual outcome of treatment.”).
See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text.
Jenkins v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 409 S.E.2d 16 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that the statutory definition of an abused or neglected child does not require proof of actual harm or impairment having been experienced by the child).
Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1184.
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terest, as that interest is irrelevant when a child is not subject to neglect or abuse. When a fundamental right is at issue there cannot be
a considerable disconnect between the means and the state interest.
Another reason why courts should be more critical as to whether
removal or termination do in fact achieve the state’s interest in protecting children is the broader perspective of the child’s best inter262
est. According to this broader view, courts should examine whether
removal or termination could actually harm the child in question.
The harms that courts should take into account are the child’s own
mental health, which could deteriorate upon separation from a par263
ent, the legal ramifications such as loss of property or other
264
265
rights, and, of course, the harms of foster care: foster care drift,
266
267
268
aging out, abuse and neglect, and disturbances to education.
Perhaps courts would do better, then, to balance the harms posed to
children who remain in the home against the harms that may occur
upon removal or termination. Courts are unable to take on this balancing task, though, if they do not engage in rigorous analysis into
these risks of harm. Courts that do not examine the child’s vulnerability to harm both at home and as a result of separation, and that
do not make conclusive findings that harms to children who are not
removed from the home are greater, should not assume that removal
of a child ensures her protection.
Finally, because family separation is the primary measure the state
utilizes to protect children from harm by parents with schizophrenia,
the risk to children is exacerbated. Parents are deterred from accessing services that can help them recover because of their fear that the

262
263

264
265

266
267

268

See Part I.C.3.c.
See Barnes & Stein, supra note 173, at 1850 (“A longitudinal comparison of children
reared with or apart from their schizophrenic mother found that the rate of psychopathology was in fact marginally higher in the group reared apart than those who had
stayed with their mothers.”); see also ALSTOTT, supra note 175, at 5 (“[P]sychologists emphasize the importance of recreating continuity for . . . children . . . .”).
See Radding, supra note 171, at 31–32 (“[S]evering a child’s ties to his natural parents result in the child’s loss of his rights to be supported by them and to inherit from them.”).
See Ramsey, supra note 181, at 24–25 (“[M]any children suffer[] multiple placements over
a lengthy period, with some being lost in the foster care system. They [are] caught
in . . . foster care ‘drift’ or ‘limbo.’”).
See Wasow, supra note 137, at 219 (stating that many children become legal orphans for a
significant period of time, many until they reach majority).
See Harper, supra note 185, at 793 (“[T]housands [of children in the foster care system]
suffer abuse or neglect in foster homes and receive inadequate medical or psychological
treatment or other services while in the system.”).
See Hudson-Plush, supra note 184, at 84 (“[T]he foster care system is replete with examples of foster children suffering poor educational outcomes.”).
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269

state will initiate removal of children.
Therefore, the parent’s
strong interest in receiving treatment and achieving recovery is undermined, resulting in a probable deterioration in their mental condition. Consequently, the child’s safety, too, is compromised because
of the parent’s deteriorating condition. By the time the state intervenes, if at all, the parent may be suffering terribly, the child could
have been severely harmed or the situation could be otherwise too
dire to avoid extreme measures such as hospitalization and family separation.
Removal or termination of parental rights must ensure child protection if they are to satisfy the substantive due process test by surviving strict scrutiny (provided they are the least restrictive means available, which the next Part discusses). However, family separation does
not necessarily achieve child protection, and might actually harm a
child. I suggest, therefore, that in order for removal or termination
to be consistent with substantive due process, to not violate the fundamental right to family integrity, and to still protect children, they
must be exercised by the state upon both a showing that a child is
harmed at home and that such harm is greater than the harm caused
by removal or termination and foster care placement. Otherwise, the
risk of wrongful removal and infringement of a fundamental right is
270
far too great.
III. A NEW CONCEPT OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: ACHIEVING
FAMILY PRESERVATION
Satisfying the last prong of the substantive due process test is highly contingent on the availability of less restrictive means that are an
alternative to more severe state intervention. Moreover, the alternative, less restrictive means must also be related to the state’s compelling interest; that is, the means must achieve child protection. Similar to education law, where removal of children from home and into
residential education settings in order to provide special education
services is considered overly restrictive if special education can be
provided at school or at home through individual education pro-

269

270

See Benjet et al., supra note 43, at 238 (arguing that diagnosis of a major mental illness
alone often suffices for termination of parental rights, without consideration of actual parenting ability).
See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764 (1982) (finding that the risk of error is greater
for parents than the state: once separation has occurred and termination may follow,
there is a great risk that separation will become irreversible for the parents, while the
state could continuously move for removal or termination).
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271

grams, it so follows that removal or termination is overly restrictive
when children can be protected from neglect or abuse while remaining in their parents’ custody. As the alternative to removal of children, I propose here the use of Programs for Assertive Community
Treatments (PACT or PACTs), which social scientists have long recognized as efficient and effective in treating schizophrenia. Notably,
PACTs are not completely foreign to the law. Indeed, at least one jurisdiction uses PACTs as an alternative to criminal proceedings, and
others have considered their use. Reshaped to accommodate families, PACTs present multiple advantages for families dealing with a
parent’s mental illness and the abuse or neglect of children. Familyoriented PACTs both treat parents and strengthen their parental
skills while children remain in their custody. PACTs can also satisfy
the state’s obligation to provide services to struggling families and
can help lower costs, financial or otherwise, of social and welfare ser272
vices. More importantly still, PACTs have the ability to prevent removal of children from the home by directly addressing the problems
families face and empowering these families to overcome such problems. I end this Part addressing some of the reservations that may
arise in incorporating PACTs as an alternative to removal of children
or termination of parental rights.
A. Programs of Assertive Community Treatment (PACTs) for Schizophrenia
Before evaluating PACTs as preventative alternatives for removal
or termination, it is essential to understand what these programs are,
how they are structured and operate, and their efficacy.
PACTs originated in the 1970s as an integrated clinical treat273
ment that would substitute hospitalization of persons with schizo274
275
phrenia, and have since been continuously empirically validated.
271

272

273

274

See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006) (stating that children with disabilities are not to be removed from regular classroom instruction unless their disabilities are so severe that education may not otherwise be achieved).
See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 295 (addressing concerns that PACTs financially drain
states: “The research evidence [shows] . . . the provision of PACT . . . reduces the burden
placed on health and human service systems”); Mason et al., supra note 6, at 1118 (“In the
long run [PACTs are] . . . more cost effective by reducing the negative effect on parents,
their children and other family members, as well as on the overall community and society . . . .”).
See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 290 (describing a PACT as a “multidisciplinary team approach, [that] delivers integrated community-based treatment, rehabilitation, and support services”).
See Anthony F. Lehman et al., Evidence-Based Treatment for Schizophrenia, 26 PSYCHIATRIC
CLINICS N. AM. 939, 943 (2003) (describing PACTs’ purpose of treating “high risk” individuals who need more than typical community-based treatment).
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PACTs are built as teams of professionals from multiple disciplines
who provide constant, comprehensive interdisciplinary services and
276
277
278
support, including at times of emergency. The goal is recovery;
to achieve and sustain clients’ participation and functioning in the
279
community. Usually, PACT teams are comprised of at least a coordinator, social worker, nurse, psychologist, employment specialist,
280
substance abuse specialist and a psychiatrist. PACTs that are geared
toward a specific skill set or area of life function typically include an
appropriate professional. For example, a team working on a person’s
family issues may include a couples’ therapist or parenting specialist.
An empathetic, cooperative and continuous relationship between the
team and the client is crucial for the program’s success in achieving
281
recovery. Paul B. Gold et al. describe the relationship between client and PACT team as follows:
Both clients and PACT teams, in their joint efforts, are the primary
change agents. . . . [A] PACT team[] . . . engage[s] clients into working
alliances, making it clear that the team recognizes suffering and wishes to
alleviate it. The . . . working alliance depends on the team’s gentle efforts . . . to instill hope for relief, foster a sense of safety and personal
control, motivate taking on the tasks of healing, respecting and ensuring
self-determination on the pathway to healing, and restoration of self282
identity as a “whole” person.

As the relationship progresses, and as a way to empower clients
and develop problem-solving skills, the team includes the patient in
designing her own recovery plan and determining the goals of treatment and appropriate interventions, given the patient’s symptoms

275
276
277
278

279

280
281
282

See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 291 (reporting that the Schizophrenia Patient Outcomes
Research Team lists PACT as a “recommended . . . first-line service”).
See Lehman et al., supra note 274, at 943 (describing “coverage 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week”).
See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 293 (discussing availability of on-call staff and psychiatrists
during nonbusiness hours).
See id. at 294 (defining recovery as “full community participation . . . [which] include[s]
(a) symptom stability, (b) health maintenance and care of medical conditions, (c) low to
no use of emergency and inpatient psychiatric facilities, public safety resources, or the judicial system, (d) stability in independent living arrangements, and (e) normalization of
activities of daily living” (emphasis added)).
See Catherine F. Kane & Michael B. Blank, NPACT: Enhancing Programs of Assertive Community Treatment for the Seriously Mentally Ill, 40 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 549, 550
(2004) (detailing recovery aimed at reduction of symptoms and substance abuse; stable
housing; employment; and better maintenance of physical health and criminal justice system interactions).
See id.
See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 291 (“PACT minimizes fragmentation of services and promotes continuity of provider-client relationships . . . .”).
See id.
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283

and environmental circumstances.
The plan is modified to accommodate the client’s changing needs and preferences to maintain
284
improvement.
Because of their ability to mitigate the severity and shorten the
285
period of symptoms, PACTs have been shown to significantly decrease the need for hospitalization, both during initial acute phases
286
of schizophrenia and during relapse. Research on PACTs has also
produced evidence of patient satisfaction, which is particularly important as people with schizophrenia struggle with commencing and
287
continuing treatment.
Other evidence shows that PACTs improve
the clinical condition of schizophrenia, advance functioning (particularly when they are designed to address a particular area of life or
288
skill set, such as vocational training) and heighten quality of life.
Programs that have the best results are those most loyal to the origi289
nal key elements of the programs, though programs that are designed to improve specific domains facilitate marked improvement in
290
those areas.
For families struggling with a parent’s schizophrenia, PACTs are
vitally important and immensely beneficial for several reasons. First,
as PACTs are comprehensive services led by a multi-disciplinary team,
PACTs can successfully address the multitude of issues with which
families (both as individuals and as a whole) may be dealing. Also,
when one team works with the family, that entire team coordinates its
efforts to advance every member of the family. This is more beneficial than several teams providing services that may overlap or be inconsistent with one another. An additional concern is that services by
different teams lead to incompatibility of services for one family
member with the needs of another’s.

283
284
285
286
287

288
289
290

See id. at 292 (describing treatment plans as “highly detailed and individualized”).
See id. (explaining that depending on degree and duration of disability, services may continue for many years).
See Kane & Blank, supra note 279, at 550 (documenting fewer hospital and emergency
room visits, and of shorter duration).
See Lehman et al., supra note 274, at 943 (discussing randomized trials showing reduction
of inpatient and more continuous outpatient treatment).
See Michael G. Gelder et al., Clinical Syndromes of Adult Psychiatry, in 2 NEW OXFORD
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 18, at 574 (listing lack of insight, which occurs in
90% of people with schizophrenia, as a factor in refusal of treatment).
See Lehman et al., supra note 274, at 943 (pointing out that research on other outcomes
has been less conistent).
See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 294 (describing study showing that programs highly consistent with PACT standards had the biggest reductions in hospital days).
See id. at 294–95. Examples include employment, substance abuse and family functioning.
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Second, by fostering a working alliance and encouraging the service recipient to take an active role in designing the treatment plan,
PACTs are able to empower everyone in the family and rectify power
imbalances. This is particularly important for children, as proactive
participation in the family treatment might mitigate emotional harms
inflicted by the parent’s illness or abuse and restore the child’s sense
291
of agency.
By mitigating emotional harms PACTs can also lower
the risk that the child herself develops a severe mental health problem later in life.
Third, PACTs’ proven ability to alleviate symptoms of schizophre292
nia, and to do so in a short period of time, means that these services
can help shorten the length of time a child may be in danger of neglect or abuse, if not eliminate that danger altogether. PACTs’
293
strength in preventing hospitalization also reduces the need to find
alternative care for children while a parent is absent due to hospitalization.
Lastly, providing services in the form of PACTs, where recipients’
294
satisfaction is high, incentivizes parents to turn to treatment and
commit to it. Because parents are reluctant to seek treatment for fear
295
of losing their children, an effective family treatment alternative
that can help ensure family preservation and prevent removal is vital.
Without it, a parent’s condition might deteriorate, resulting in a
heightened risk of neglect or abuse and subsequent removal or termination.
B. PACTs in the Law: Alternative to Criminal Proceedings
Noting the recognition PACTs have achieved in the social sciences, lawmakers have begun to incorporate PACTs into the legal sys-

291

292
293
294

295

For the psychological harm caused by imbalanced relationships, as well as the need for reshifting that imbalance and empowering the weaker party, see generally Orly Rachmilovitz, Bringing Down the Bedroom Walls: Emphasizing Substance over Form in Personalized Abuse,
14 WM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495 (2008).
See Kane & Blank, supra note 279, at 550 (stating that services are aimed at reducing “duration [and] intensity” of symptoms).
See Lehman et al., supra note 274, at 943 (citing a study showing substantial reduction in
inpatient care).
See Gelder et al., supra note 287, at 574 (explaining that patients’ lack of insight to their
psychosis, as well as inadequate education and fear of side effects, impede the formation
of therapeutic relationships, contributing to refusal of treatment).
See Busch & Redlich, supra note 50, at 1000–02, and accompanying text, discussing the
finding that for at least some parents, the fear of losing child custody results in the delay
of necessary treatment.
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296

tem. Orange and Osceola Counties in Florida have gone so far as
to establish PACTs as an alternative to criminal proceedings under
297
the special needs diversion program. The Texas legislature has also
recommended incorporating PACTs to serve criminal courts in an attempt to prevent incarceration of persons with severe mental ill298
ness.
As the Florida program is already in place, it is the focus of
this Part.
The Florida special needs diversion program aims to redirect
people with mental health or other special needs out of the criminal
justice system, and instead provide them with the most appropriate
299
treatment to their needs while still ensuring community protection.
Identification of those in need of services, as part of the diversion
program, is made by corrections health services staff upon arrest, or
by referrals from justice officials, family members or others in the
community who believe a mental disorder is at the root of one’s in300
volvement in the criminal system.
Individuals excluded from the
program are those currently charged or formerly convicted of gener301
ally violent crimes or sex crimes, including crimes against children.
296

297

298

299
300
301

Examples include: Oklahoma’s statutory definition of PACT (among other state recognized mental health services), OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 3-302(8) (2008); Massachusetts’ bill
to allocate state funds to PACTs, H.B. 5300, 182d Gen. Ct., 2002 Mass. Acts 412; and New
Jersey’s proclaimed encouragement of state established PACTs, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:9A-1
(West 2009).
Amended Order Governing Pretrial Release, Pretrial Detention, and First Appearance
Proceedings in Orange County at 69, Admin. Order No. 2003-39-12 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7,
2003), available at http://www.ninthcircuit.org/research/legal_research.shtml (listing
Florida Assertive Community Treatment as part of the treatment component of a voluntary Mental Health Court program). Florida also has specialized Mental Health Courts
that deal with mentally disabled offenders in an attempt to direct them into treatment rather than incarceration. See generally LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 29 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 255 (2001) (arguing that mental health courts provide a partial solution to legal and social problems created by criminal cases involving defendants with mental disorders); Susan Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 507 (2005) (debating the efficacy of the mental health court model from
the perspectives of an academic specializing in therapeutic jurisprudence and an advocate for the rights of the mentally disabled).
See AUSTIN TRAVIS COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL RETARDATION CENTER, JAIL
DIVERSION INITIATIVE (2005). This report recommends that PACTs that are already in
use in Texas be expanded, and that special teams be dedicated to servicing courts. However, for this to be effective, the state should allocate additional funding, and courts must
be aware of the high success rates of PACTs both in providing treatment and in decreasing recidivism.
See Amended Order Governing Pretrial Release, Pretrial Detention, and First Appearance
Proceedings in Orange County, supra note 297.
See id. at 67.
See id. at 66–67. An exception is made for domestic violence crimes—and an individual
can be included in the program upon the victim’s approval.
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Once a mental health professional finds the defendant capable of
participation in services, and recommends that the court divert the
defendant into services, the court will refer the defendant to the appropriate services. Such services may be PACTs, as well as alternative
302
or additional services as needed. The court will also appoint a corrections officer or social worker to design a specialized treatment
303
plan and supervise the progress of such treatment.
Though the Florida program seems to be on the right track gen304
erally, it is problematic in several respects. Primarily, the program’s
exclusion of violent offenders is troubling, because it leaves those
who presumably would require the most help out of the program and
305
without treatment. Arguably, the state would have a greater interest
in protecting potential victims from violent offenders, and is thus less
motivated to divert these offenders into treatment rather than incarceration. However, this very reasoning delegitimizes the program. If
the program is in fact based on the premise that those suffering from
mental illness who commit a crime because of that illness should not be
penalized under the criminal system and should instead receive
treatment and other social services, why should the nature of the offense matter? Does a violent offense cancel out the fact that the offense is a result of a mental illness, while other, less severe crimes do
not?
The exclusion of violent offenders who are mentally disordered
also conflicts with the program’s proclaimed mission to provide mentally disordered offenders with the most appropriate treatment to
306
their needs, while still ensuring community protection.
This is a
balancing task between the offender’s need for treatment and the
public’s safety. It is not clear why this balance is achievable only when
the offense is not a violent one. After all, if the offender’s mental
disorder is at the root of the offense, and if that mental disorder is

302
303
304
305

306

See id. at 68–69. This takes place as early in the judicial process as possible, preferably as
early as the first hearing.
See id. at 69.
Searches of legal databases have not resulted in material discussing the program, or its
efficacy. I therefore base my analysis on the regulations alone.
As discussed in Part I, people with mental health problems are usually violent when illness is co-occurring, that is when they suffer from more than one mental health problem
in conjunction. These tend to be the more complex cases. See Benjet et al., supra note
43, at 240 (reviewing research correlating violence, mental illness, and substance abuse);
Izutsu, supra note 15, at 1018–19 (referring to study showing that risk of violence among
people with schizophrenia is only heightened where there is co-occurring substance
abuse).
See Amended Order Governing Pretrial Release, Pretrial Detention, and First Appearance
Proceedings in Orange County, supra note 297.

Mar. 2010]

DUE PROCESS THROUGH COMPREHENSIVE CARE

839

treated, then it would follow that the now mentally healthy offender
will not pose a threat to public safety. Again, the distinction between
“regular” and “violent” crimes is puzzling. Why have faith in treatments’ ability to prevent future crimes but not their ability to prevent
violent crimes? Further, if we do think that treatment can prevent
violent crimes, but the risk for community safety is too great, why the
blanket exclusion? If the Florida program is serious about balancing
treatment with community protection, it should be able to strike the
balance on a case-by-case basis, rather than have an all-encompassing
exclusion of violent offenders from the possibility of receiving treatment.
Lastly, in the context of families, there is also room for improvement. While the program excludes those who have committed
crimes against children, it does allow domestic violence offenders to
participate in the program and receive treatment, upon the victim’s
307
consent.
This deference to victims influences decisions regarding
their mentally disordered aggressor, respects the victim’s agency and
demonstrates an awareness of the complexity of crimes committed
within the family, as well as an understanding that a victim may be in308
terested more in the offender’s recovery than criminalization. And
though we should not always expect child-victims to be able to make
this decision (particularly at a young age), it may be worthwhile to
explore the possibility of treatment in some cases of crimes against
children rather than, again, summarily dismissing treatment and excluding all cases of crimes against children from the diversion program.
Despite these flaws to the program, its recognition of the importance of social services and treatment is very encouraging. Just as
these legal frameworks utilize evidence-based programs, such as
PACTs, as less restrictive alternatives to criminal proceedings, it can
be advantageous to employ successful treatment services in other areas of law as well. The next Part will present the benefits of PACTs to
parents with schizophrenia and their neglected or abused children.
C. Reforming PACTs as Family-Oriented: The Least Restrictive Mean
PACTs’ status as an evidence-based, highly successful treatment
for schizophrenia, as well as its incorporation into the criminal legal

307
308

See id.
See Rachmilovitz, supra note 291, at 505–07 (discussing the complexities of withdrawal
from abusive relationships because of the dependence of the abused party on the abuser).
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system, is reason to hope that PACTs can benefit families affected by
parents’ mental illness and the consequent neglect or abuse of children. However, for PACTs to be successful in treating families as well
as individuals, they should be redesigned to address the special needs
of these families.
Though PACTs that stray far from their original design are less
successful in ensuring recovery, not all PACTs need be uniform to
provide effective treatment. As discussed above, PACT services are
often reshaped to address a person’s specific needs. It would follow,
then, that for persons with schizophrenia who are struggling with
raising their children, it would be most beneficial to create a familyoriented PACT plan. This Part discusses how, along with working toward recovery, this type of treatment plan could potentially teach parenting skills, provide mental health assistance to both parent and
child (together or severally) and rebuild or strengthen a child-parent
bond. A successful plan can restore the child’s well-being in the
home and alleviate concerns for her safety, thus eliminating the need
to remove the child. A family-oriented PACT also helps the parent
recover and achieves both child protection and family preservation.
Therefore it is narrowly tailored to serve the state’s compelling interest, thus surviving constitutional scrutiny.
1. Family-Oriented PACTs—Why and How
PACTs’ success lies in individual treatment plans that address the
multiple and complex issues with which a person with schizophrenia
is coping. For those with children, participating in comprehensive
family-oriented PACTs can be a path to recovery and a way to main309
tain family well-being.
The holistic approach of family-focused
treatment is particularly important to families of parents with schizophrenia, because the child’s well-being is highly contingent on that of
310
the parents.
A great advantage to PACTs over other forms of
treatment is that PACTs accomplish indirect recovery goals such as
improved family dynamics, because PACTs provide comprehensive
services and also offer competent specialized intervention, enabling

309

310

See Walton-Moss et al., supra note 57, at 638–39 (identifying three types of management
styles of families coping with mental illness: “Hanging On” families, “Being Stable” families and “Doing Well” families. Families may remain in earlier, more difficult stages of
coping, and never progress toward “Doing Well” but for support and intervention).
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 191 (discussing the benefits of assessments “that include
multiple, interdisciplinary sources of information in multiple contexts”).

Mar. 2010]

DUE PROCESS THROUGH COMPREHENSIVE CARE

841

311

parents to achieve more than basic recovery.
Another benefit of
family-oriented treatment is that by involving family members in
treatment, as well as treating family members themselves, the collaborative relationship between the family and the PACT team can en312
courage treatment adherence and ensure support toward recovery
of the family as a whole.
In addition to the basic standard PACT plan services, familyoriented PACTs should be designed to include services such as assessment of parenting skills, monitoring of child well-being, child development and parenting training, family planning support, trauma
and abuse counseling, marital and family counseling, and assistance
313
with children’s education needs.
A potential concern about family-oriented PACTs is that by straying from the original model and its basic elements, the program risks
314
Yet this concern is relevant
its efficacy and compromises success.
primarily to programs that detract from the basic standards or mini315
mum elements required to produce positive change.
Unlike such
programs, family-oriented PACTs do not eliminate elements from the
basic program, but rather add to the model and complement other
316
areas of treatment with family services.
The success of familyoriented PACTs already in place is evidence that these types of services do not derail treatment, but instead reduce family conflict and
317
strengthen the family as a positive support system.
An additional challenge that family-oriented PACTs may present
is the ethical obligation of PACT team members. Service providers
treating families as a whole, or as individuals, now may face added
conflicts of interests between their clients, as they would become obligated to uphold confidentiality and other professional duties to several clients whose treatment is interrelated but whose interests, as
embodied in the treatment plan, may conflict. Such challenges to
311
312
313

314
315
316
317

See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 297 (examining the training, supervision and consultation
by PACT experts).
See Busch & Redlich, supra note 50, at 1001 (finding that for at least some parents, stigma
and fear of losing child custody resulted in delaying needed treatment).
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 192 (examining programs designed to teach parenting skills
to mothers with schizophrenia); Mason et al., supra note 6, at 1118 (discussing multidisciplinary service needs identified in a study by Cook and Steigman (2000)).
See Gold et al., supra note 9, at 294 (“Programs with highest relative fidelity to key elements of the PACT model seem to produce the strongest outcomes.”).
See id. at 297. These basic elements for PACTs can be team size and configuration,
staff/client ratios, admission criteria, treatment planning, frequency of contact, etc.
See id. (discussing the PACT alliance with other community resources and the involvement of family, social and community networks).
Id. at 294–95.
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ethical duties and professional responsibilities have inspired broad
discussions in different professions from social services to medicine
and law. It could be helpful to adopt some of the solutions utilized
by those professions. One common method is the use of informed
318
consent : the service provider discusses the conflict with all parties
involved, presents available actions that could resolve the conflict and
their consequences in an attempt to secure their awareness and consent to the conflict or to its proposed resolution.
Family-oriented PACTs would require specialized training of staff
and allocation of resources to manage the multiple and complex is319
sues of family treatment. Yet shifting the PACT team’s focus from
treating one individual to supporting her whole family in the context
of her unique circumstances is instrumental to family preservation.
These comprehensive PACTs take on broader, more encompassing
treatment goals that are family-oriented. They therefore increase
family functioning and lead to positive outcomes regarding parenting
320
skills, family relationships and children’s well-being.
As such,
PACTs are a strong and useful tool for preventing child removal or
termination of parental rights, and thus preserving a family in which
a parent is on her way to recovery and the child is out of harm’s way.
2. Family-Oriented PACTs—Narrowly Tailored and Preserving Families
To ensure the substantive due process rights of parents and children, their fundamental right to family preservation can only be infringed upon by the state if the state’s action is narrowly tailored to
serve the compelling state interest in protecting children. Compared
to removal or termination, which infringe on family integrity, services
provided through family-oriented PACTs are a much less extreme
measure to ensure children’s safety. This narrowly tailored, less restrictive mean should replace removal or termination whenever possible. Similar to the use of PACTs as an alternative to criminal proceedings, families would be better served if legislatures and courts
would establish PACTs as the default measure in cases of abuse or
neglect of children to parents with schizophrenia. Only upon a

318
319

320

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4) (2002).
See Mason et al., supra note 6, at 1117 (“There is a need to provide continuing education
for clinicians to move from treating only the client with the mental illness and to begin
viewing the family as a unit and the focus of care.”).
See id. at 1106–07 (“Mental health advocates stress that with the right services and supports, many parents with mental illness and their families can remain together and function adequately.”).
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PACT’s failure to facilitate the parent’s recovery, or to guarantee the
child’s protection, should removal or termination be considered.
Recall ASFA and the critique regarding the statute’s mandate to
provide “reasonable” services to parents, which in effect results in
321
very limited or no services. Incorporating PACTs as an alternative
clarifies the adequate standard for services the state is to provide. Indeed, such detailed guidelines limit judicial discretion because the
court is no longer free to decide which services are reasonable. Of
course, judicial discretion is not eliminated. Rather, discretion shifts
322
from a formal test to a substantive one. Courts would now look at
the adequacy of service when clear, pre-determined standards for
treatment are available. The courts would now exercise discretion in
deciding whether these services were provided in a manner that satisfies the “reasonable” requirement in ASFA. This would ensure that
families do in fact receive a minimal standard of services from the
state.
Additionally, utilizing PACTs as an alternative to removal or termination challenges the presumption established in the Virginia statute; that a parent with schizophrenia is an unfit parent and should
therefore be separated from her child. Instead, PACTs are an opportunity for parents to improve their parenting skills and to take an active role in creating a healthier environment for themselves and their
children. By affording parents this vital opportunity, lawmakers shift
the default paradigm; a parent is no longer unfit due to a mental disorder alone. Such a finding regarding the parent’s fitness would in
effect now require a finding based on in-depth scrutiny, that a parent
is unable to recover and regain parental skills despite the availability
of a PACT program.
As a preventative measure that lessens the need for removal or
termination as a way to protect children and still maintain family integrity, PACTs comport more with substantive due process than current interventions which do not prioritize family preservation. Such
interventions only attempt family preservation after a child has already been removed, usually in cases of emergency. This may be too
little, too late. While separating the child from her parent protects
her from neglect or abuse by her parents, it exposes her to other
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See supra Part I.C.1.
A ruling whether certain types of services are reasonable would be a formal test, while inquiring into whether the services themselves, the way they were provided and their efficacy for a particular family, were adequate would be a substantive test. Further discussion
of such a substantive test is out of the scope of this paper, and I therefore leave it to future work.
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harms. By maintaining family preservation and preventing removal,
PACTs help safeguard the parent-child attachment, which in turn
323
Provision
minimizes risks for later termination of parental rights.
of services can prevent unnecessary removal and pursuant termina324
tion, and allow children to remain in their parents’ care.
Additionally, by centralizing all services provided to the family
under one roof, rather than delegating them to different authorities
(such as mental health systems and child welfare), PACTs’ coordi325
nated services facilitate their efficiency.
The concern for conflicting treatments or gaps in treatment is mitigated, as well as the need
for time-consuming, costly communications between different service
providers, assuming these communications do occur. Because of
PACTs’ efficiency and success, they are less intrusive than other interventions. PACTs are able to be effective in a short period of time,
and therefore they are less obstructive to family life than removal or
termination, which are more prolonged processes.
Not only are PACTs less restrictive than removal or termination,
but they serve the state’s interest on a broad scale. In addition to allowing a child to remain in her parent’s care, PACTs address the parent’s and the child’s need for treatment or support, strengthen parental skills and restore attachments and healthy family dynamics. In
doing so, PACTs achieve recovery for parents and protection for
children—both of which can be viewed as state interests on a macro
level, all without removing children into foster care which infringes
on parents’ and children’s rights to family preservation and substantive due process.
D. Potential Challenges to Utilizing PACTs
Despite the advantages to family preservation, incorporating family-oriented PACTs as a less restrictive alternative to child removal or
termination of parental rights has its shortcomings. In this Subpart I
present two possible counterarguments to PACTs and explain how
they can be rebutted.

323

324

325

See Huntington, supra note 201, at 690 (“In the ideal model of family group conferencing
the conference occurs before removal, thus the risk of damaging the bond between parent and child by preemptive removal is minimized.”).
See Ramsey, supra note 181, at 24 (“A major concern was that children were being removed from their homes unnecessarily when the provision of services could have allowed
them to stay home.”).
See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 189 (citing a study of case management clients in Massachusetts).
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1. Do PACTs Achieve Child Protection?
To pass muster under the substantive due process test, in addition
to being least restrictive, PACTs must also serve the state’s compelling
interest: child protection. A significant concern is that allowing
children to remain in their parents’ care while the family participates
in a PACT program leaves children vulnerable to neglect or abuse,
and that PACTs can only ensure child protection at the end of a
process, but not in cases of imminent danger. For this reason, I
would advise cautious optimism and close supervision.
PACTs might not be appropriate in each and every case. My proposal here is not to mandate PACTs whenever a child is at risk as a result of a parent’s struggle with schizophrenia. I merely argue that
substantive due process requires that courts consider PACTs as a first
line of defense, rather than resorting to removal or termination. As
long as courts are mindful of the possibility for treatment through
PACTs as a preventative alternative to removal, they are able to explore the adequacy and potential for success of this opportunity on a
326
case-by-case basis.
It may be useful for courts to think of parents with schizophrenia
327
as falling into one of three groups. The first group would include
parents who are capable of safely raising their children and therefore
should not be separated from their children at all. In the second
group are parents who will likely benefit from PACTs over a longer
period of time. Here, if courts find it necessary to remove children
because of an emergency, the length of separation should be strictly
limited with the goal of reuniting families as soon as the PACT program starts producing positive results. The last group would comprise of parents who are incapable of raising their children, and
where prospects of a PACT being successful are too dim. Courts
would decide which parents belong in which group, keeping in mind
that the third group should be strictly limited to only the most severe
and hopeless cases. Only if the court has taken a PACT into account
but found it highly likely to fail in that particular case (if a parent is
unable or unwilling to consent or participate, or if a child is in severe
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This Article proposes PACTs as a generally available less restrictive alternative, but it is
out of its scope to address or propose tests to distinguish cases where PACTs would be
appropriate and those where removal is still a better suited option for child protection.
I leave the matter of which guidelines or tests are appropriate for courts to distinguish
between parents in each group to future scholarship. Such attempt is out of the scope of
this Article because it detracts from my main argument that PACTs should, at the very
least, be considered as an alternative before removal of children or termination of parental rights.
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imminent danger which a PACT could not relieve, for example), and
a PACT becomes a futile attempt at a less restrictive alternative, then
removal or termination would become a preferable measure that satisfies substantive due process.
In cases of emergency, for instance, Virginia law allows social services agencies to remove the child from her home for up to four
hours. Within this short period of time, social services are to petition
328
In the petition, the
for a court issued emergency removal order.
agency must show that reasonable efforts to prevent removal have
been made, and that there are no less restrictive alternatives to re329
moval that would ensure the reasonable protection of the child.
This proceeding seems like a good opportunity to incorporate a
PACT into the process. First, the initial removal is for a very limited
period of time, which can help eliminate concerns regarding harm to
a child that is separated for longer and placed in foster care. Second,
as this statute requires the court to consider less restrictive means,
evaluating the efficacy of a PACT in such cases of emergency is not a
far cry from what courts are currently directed by law to do. If the
court still is not persuaded that a PACT will ensure a child’s safety,
then there may be no other way but to remove the child beyond the
initial four hours.
Lastly, because of the nature of PACTs as hands-on comprehensive services, the PACT team can closely supervise the progress of
parents and children and report back to the court if need be. By
constantly monitoring families, the team would be able to notice
whether neglect or abuse are ongoing. Their awareness and familiarity with the family should allow PACT teams to intervene quickly by
changing or intensifying services to ensure the child’s safety. Again,
in extreme cases, PACTs might be unable to help families recover
and prevent harm to children, and therefore there would not be an
alternative that would protect children as well as maintain family integrity.
Because PACTs may not be able to ensure a child is always safe
from harm or neglect or abuse, they should be evaluated in the context of a particular case. Children’s safety should not be compro-
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VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-251(A) (2008).
Id. § 16.1-251(A)(2). The statute suggests alternatives such as “medical, educational, psychiatric, psychological, homemaking or other similar services to the child or family” as
less drastic. To bolster courts’ awareness about PACTs as possible interventions that are
less drastic, the Virginia legislature would do well to specify them in this section of the statute. Perhaps more preferably, lawmakers could make PACTs the default, less drastic alternative for courts and social services to explore.
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mised, and occasionally there is no alternative to family separation.
To comply with substantive due process rights it is not necessary for
courts to always utilize PACTs as a less restrictive means; it is, however, crucial that courts are aware of PACTs’ benefits and strengths
and, at the very least, take them into account as a possible alternative
to removal where appropriate.
2. Are PACTs Positive Rights?
Another possible opposition to utilizing PACTs as an alternative to
removal or termination is the objection to creating an expansive wel330
fare system that overly burdens the state.
Provision of services requires states to actively step into the private sphere of families, and, as
such, can be viewed by some as a positive right that is inconsistent
with ideas of personal liberty and principles of non-interventionist
government. I offer two main responses to this argument: one, that
state intervention in the form of PACTs in effect protects liberty interests; and, two, that because the state cannot avoid interfering in
cases of families so severely affected by a parent’s schizophrenia, it
must take measures that are effective and in accordance with due
process rights.
As discussed above, family preservation is a fundamental right that
stems from coupling the expansive freedom parents hold in the
331
childrearing process and the child’s interest in remaining in her
parents’ care. These aggregated rights are a liberty independent of
the state, so long as parents’ childrearing decisions are reasonable
332
and the child is not harmed.
Thus, a state that allows families to
participate in PACTs in an attempt to achieve family preservation
protects their liberties and enables them to exercise that liberty in the
only way that can preserve it continuously. Put differently, without

330
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332

As to the possible financial burden on states utilizing PACTs, because of the high costs of
foster care, prolonged removal or termination proceedings and hospitalization, it is possible that establishing PACTs will be more cost-effective. Also, since a number of states,
including Virginia, already have PACTs in place providing services to people with schizophrenia, utilizing them would not require the allocation of as many funds as would be required when creating PACT teams. Regarding the cost efficiency of family preservation
services compared to foster care, see generally ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 134–35.
See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (finding it “entirely plain that [a
particular Act of Congress] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”).
See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 199, at 36 (discussing the “minimum degree of care” parents
need to exercise in order to prevent state intervention); GUGGENHEIM ET AL., supra note
209, at 94 (“A parent’s past behavior is relevant in child protection only to the extent that
it reflects on a parent’s capacity to raise children adequately in the future.”).
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PACTs, parents suffering from schizophrenia are on a “fast track” to
lose their children. Therefore, PACTs are vital to preserving their
liberty interests. State intervention through PACT services, effectively, does not infringe on family preservation, but rather is needed
334
to facilitate it. Instead of framing PACTs as positive rights (that is,
that one has a right to services through PACTs), a more accurate
framing of the issue would be a framework which recognizes a
broader right to family preservation and PACTs as the means to accomplish that broader liberty.
Another justification for the use of PACTs, even as a positive right,
is the state’s compelling interest in child protection. Due to this
compelling interest one would be hard pressed to argue against state
intervention altogether. However, once the state intervenes, it must
provide effective interventions, rather than interventions that could
335
prove futile. Currently, the standard the law employs is that services
are “reasonable.” This is considered the appropriate standard, because it balances the need for intervention with the potential burden
to the state. However, “reasonable” is in effect an inadequate standard for services provided by the state. As seen in the case of Toms v.
336
Hanover Department of Social Services, “reasonable” services can turn
into no services at all because courts may find that in the case of mentally disordered parents where a prima facie case of unfitness exists,
the state is not obligated to provide services. Therefore, to ensure
337
services that—again—protect multiple rights and interests, perhaps
the standard should be elevated to adequately reflect the gravity of
such rights and interests.
A standard of “effective” services guarantees that services are not
futile and that public resources invested in providing services do not
333

334

335

336
337

See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 188 (“Policies intended to promote a speedier resolution
for children in out-of-home care may have an unintended discriminatory effect by singling out parents who have a diagnosed mental illness for ‘fast track’ termination of their
parental rights.”).
See Wasow, supra note 137, at 220 (“[D]enial of services clearly implicates liberty interests
of enormous magnitude. The strong, constitutionally protected interest at stake for the
parent should militate in favor of giving her an opportunity to try to address the circumstances that led to the child being taken into foster care.”).
See Mary Ellen C. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 971 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Ariz. 1999). In this
case, the mother who suffered from several co-existing mental disorders challenged a decision to terminate her parental rights. The court found that “although the State is not
obliged to undertake futile rehabilitative measures, it is obliged to undertake those which
offer a reasonable possibility of success.” Id.
616 S.E.2d 765, 771 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Among such rights and interests are the right to family preservation, substantive due
process rights, the state’s interest in protecting children and even its interest in parents’
and children’s mental health.
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go to waste. Services that are merely reasonable may not be suitable
for parents with schizophrenia and their children, and thus may be
doomed to fail. Services that are not designed to address the unique
needs of parents with schizophrenia are unsuccessful; parents do not
adhere to treatment, and they are often unable to learn and imple338
PACTs, contrastingly, do increase treatment them in their lives.
ment adherence and produce positive results for participants. Therefore, because states have chosen to intervene and to offer services
that can be seen as positive rights, they should do so in a manner that
is fruitful and beneficial to participants. PACTs have proven to be
just that.
CONCLUSION
The impact of schizophrenia on families is disheartening, and
while children are vulnerable to harm if left at home, their well-being
is not ensured by separating them from their parents. As a comprehensive treatment plan, PACTs hold great potential for positive
growth. Because it already has operating state-sponsored PACTs, Virginia can become a true trailblazer for many other jurisdictions if it
changes current law governing parents with mental illness to incorporate PACTs as a preventative alternative for family separation. The
result would be improving the mental health of parents and children,
better protecting children, and preserving families according to substantive due process rights.
Such a change in the law dealing with struggling families can be
expanded beyond the context of mental illness to other instances
where parental unfitness is questioned. Perhaps better protections of
substantive due process rights and family preservation are available
for parents with substance abuse problems, parents involved in criminal proceedings, or divorcing parents challenging each others’ fitness. I leave these matters, though, for future endeavors.
In this Article, I attempted to challenge family separation and lay
a foundation for better serving the needs of families that struggle
with schizophrenia, not as parties with opposing interests, but as one
collective in need of support. PACTs’ comprehensive care brings on

338

See Ackerson, supra note 4, at 191. Ackerson states that social services that are designed to
improve parenting skills are not fitted for parents with mental illnesses. Parents with
mental illness, then, often drop out of such programs or—if they do participate—are unable to benefit from them. “[T]he didactic method of instruction combined with the severity of [these parents’] illness may impede their ability to apply the lessons to their own
situations.” Id.
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recovery and well-being to all family members, as well as produces
healthier family dynamics. Already endorsed by certain legal systems,
PACTs, I believe, are the superior, less restrictive alternative that
serves parents. Only when lawmakers and social services providers
join together to optimally advance families are parents and children
ensured their due process rights.

